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ROPER: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law! 
MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the 
law to get after the Devil? 
ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that! 
MORE: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil 
turned round on you - where would you hide, Roper, the laws all 
being flat? This country's planted thick with laws from coast to 
coast - Man's laws, not God's - and if you cut them down -
and you're just the man to do it - d'you really think you could 
stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the 
Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake. 1 
In the last several years a war has been waged on the Fourth 
Amendment, along with wars on drugs and on crime generally.2 Pre-
sumably, the former has been undertaken in an effort to facilitate the 
latter. In all candor, the Fourth Amendment, to the extent that it has 
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been taken seriously, is frequently a formidable obstacle to law enforce-
ment. 3 This fact is not cause for alarm; rather, it shows that the purpose 
of the amendment is at least sometimes realized. Restraints on govern-
ment power form the essence of the Bill of Rights and particularly of the 
Fourth Amendment.4 
The elusive goal of crime control seems to some to lie just beyond 
the next constitutional stumbling block, 5 its realization impeded only by 
the removal of one more "technicality" that protects those responsible 
for crime from their deserved punishment. 6 Adjustment of the criminal 
justice system and the framework oflaws constructed to effectuate Amer-
ican criminal law policy is essential to achieving all of the crime control 
benefits that realistically can be wrung from our constitutional scheme. 
"Tinkering" with or "fine tuning" the system inevitably entails some 
danger that through shortsightedness or excessive zeal or other human 
frailty, the wrong decisions will be made for the right reasons. In itself, 
this is not especially alarming, because law, especially in a system that 
still considers itself part of the common law tradition, is meant to 
change. Every American lawyer accepts that the law will change and 
that changes will often occur with frightening speed. 
The reasonable response to those who dislike particular changes is 
that these wrong decisions can be righted by the same facile system that 
allowed the change in the first place. Although experimentation may 
produce short-term disappointment or danger, it can, if properly con-
3. Cf Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983) (Supreme Court noted in abandoning 
the Spinelli test for probable cause that "[t]he strictures that inevitably accompany the 'two-
pronged test' cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement."). Some doubt 
that the exclusionary rule is much of an obstacle to law enforcement, but its existence, along 
with the perceptions of its effectiveness, may well produce a considerable systemic response. 
Even the very existence of the Fourth Amendment, without the exclusionary rule as an en-
forcement device, undoubtedly dissuades some officers and agencies from conduct they believe 
is contrary to its protections. See Arnold H. Loewy, A Modest Proposal for Fighting Organized 
Crime: Stop Taking the Fourth Amendment So Seriously, 16 RUTGERS LJ. 831 (1985) (police 
officers fail to take advantage of search opportunities afforded them by the Supreme Court). 
4. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.6, at 56 (1984); JACOB W. 
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CoNSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION 44 (1st ed. 1966); see John M. Burkoff, When is a Search not a 
"Search?" Fourth Amendment Doublethink, 15 U. TaL. L. REv. 515, 522 (1984) (the aim of 
the Fourth Amendment is to prevent breaches of personal privacy by agents of the State). 
5. See David S. Catuogno, Note, "Special Needs Beyond the Normal Need for Law En-
forcement" Doctrine Excuses Traditional Fourth Amendment Requirements in Toxicological 
Testing of Railroad Employees- Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assoc., 109 S. Ct. 
1402, (1989), 20 SETON HALL L. REv. 582, 582-83 (1990) (public sentiment favors closing the 
apparent loophole afforded criminals by Fourth Amendment). 
6. Americans have probably always believed, as they do now, that the courts and laws 
favored the accused at the expense of the innocent. See RICHARD SHENKMAN, LEGENDS, 
LIES AND CHERISHED MYTHS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 158-60 (1988). 
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trolled, eventually result in great advances. America is itself the product 
of experimentation; it is an adaptable country. Most Americans would 
probably agree that despite the regrettable mistakes the country has 
made, it has achieved a great deal in a relatively short time because of its 
willingness to change. 
This process of change cannot, however, be applied equally to all 
laws. A constitution is qualitatively different from legislative enactments 
and judicial pronouncements. Among other things, it is a limiting law, a 
philosophical barrier beyond which other laws may not pass. Changing a 
constitution is a serious matter. 
Constitutional prescriptions provide a stability and permanence that 
generate social confidence.7 This is not to say that a constitution is not 
subject to interpretation. But its mandates need not be so specific that it 
periodically becomes obsolete. Rather, a constitution defines boundaries 
that are not subject to whim and caprice because they represent some 
sacred principles that a society has embraced. Justice Brennan noted: 
A constitutional right is of little comfort if the government is free 
whimsically to repeal it the moment it is invoked. Wary of the 
fragility of constitutional guarantees, the Framers of our Constitu-
tion devised an amendment process that all but precludes the dimi-
nution of the textual rights. They made it extraordinarily difficult 
to amend any of the Constitution's terms including the rights that 
were themselves appended by amendment. 8 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in its role as interpreter of 
these boundaries and the sacred principles they protect, has a very great 
responsibility.9 It may be likened to the priestess charged with the care 
7. Some may disagree that Americans in the 1990s are reassured or even aware of consti-
tutional principles. But there is at least a vague awareness of the larger principles that per-
vades popular culture. No television police show is complete without numerous references to 
"Miranda rights," search warrants, or civil rights complaints. Law may not be well under-
stood by contemporary society, but we are all aware of it, at least as a mysterious omnipres-
ence. If the contours of the Fourth Amendment are hazy in the modem American mind, the 
amendment at least exists as a deeply ingrained sense of the right to be left alone. 
8. See William J. Brennan Jr., The Worldwide Influence of the United States Constitution 
as a Charter of Human Rights, 15 NovA L. REv. 1 (1991); Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitu-
tion in the Year 2011, 18 PAC. L.J. 343,344 (1987). Professor Tribe described the Constitution 
as the only law that "has almost attained the status of scripture" and that we as a nation 
"virtually worship." Id. This probably overstates the point considerably for most Americans; 
constitutional principles are not sacred in any religious sense, but they may be sacred in the 
sense of their permanence and our consensus that they are ideals a society should adopt. 
9. Judicial review may be a self-imposed responsibility, but it is well past questioning on 
other than purely historical grounds. When the Court accepted (or assumed) the role of inter-
preter of the Constitution, it simultaneously accepted the responsibility of interpreting the 
document in a manner consistent with the principles it could derive from the Constitution. 
Otherwise, judicial review would be a usurpation of the power reserved to the people. While 
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and feeding of the House Snake in ancient Greek kingdoms. 10 But our 
Supreme Court Justices have a more difficult task because unlike pries-
tesses, they live in society and see at least a part of society in microcosm 
in their courtroom. 
Although judges do see society in microcosm, they see a very 
skewed vision of society. Especially in criminal cases, judges see the 
worst of society. Through testimony and transcripts they are repeatedly 
shown vicious assaults, dope dealing, property crimes motivated by 
greed, and other forms of human weakness and depravity. If judges 
come to believe that what they see represents society as a whole, it is little 
wonder that they are tempted to react to that vision of society with in-
creasingly harsh punishments and diminished concern for the rights of 
the accused. Perhaps very few judges consciously react to cases in this 
way, but how many weigh the seriousness of crime as a national problem 
without reference to their own courtroom experiences? Judges can, of 
course, benefit greatly from the kinds of professional and life experiences 
that permit them to foresee the impact their decisions will have, or to 
assess the nature of the persons and institutions within the criminal jus-
tice system that will ultimately apply those decisions. Unfortunately, to 
the extent most judges have this perspective, it is limited to an under-
standing of the needs of the government since they have never themselves 
been accused or suspected of criminal activity, and have usually not rep-
resented those who have. 
Judges engage in constitutional decisionmaking with full and some-
times awful knowledge of its effect on the prosecution of a crime. The 
extent to which this knowledge shades the outcome has been endlessly 
debated, but that it does so is a basic tenet of jurisprudence. 11 For exam-
ple, it is inconceivable that recent Fourth Amendment interpretation 
favorable to the prosecution has occurred by pure coincidence in a soci-
ety preoccupied with the high incidence of crime - particularly violent 
and drug-related crime. Numerous commentators have reported and la-
mented this pro-law enforcement bias. 12 In future years, commentators 
the line between interpretation and amendment is often indistinct, courts in a representative 
democracy dare not admit more than the former. 
10. Cf DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
PoLmcs 13 (1986) ("Justices constitute a kind of secular priesthood"). 
11. See Sol Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 19 (1990); cf. Silas J. 
Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 11 
GEo. L.J. 19, 48 (1988) (Balancing tests are subject to "slippage" when the Court is under 
political pressure to crack down on criminals.). 
12. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 4; Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking 
Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257, 260 (1983); Wisotsky, supra note 2, at 907-09; 
Winter 1992] "SPECIAL NEEDS" AND PROBABLE CAUSE 299 
will undoubtedly lament, as they did during the Warren Court years, 13 
constitutional interpretation favoring the accused. To merely observe 
these swings of the pendulum, criticize the decisions, and then brand 
them examples of judicial activism is overly simplistic. That sort of anal-
ysis suggests that faithfulness to the Constitution can be measured by the 
proximity of a decisional result to some philosophical median. That phil-
osophical median might happen to coincide with the core values of the 
Constitution. But if the median instead represents the thinking of the 
day, 14 or even some median point between the extreme views being advo-
cated but one inconsistent with constitutional principles, then criticism 
of the decision is justified. In short, adherence to the Fourth Amend-
ment's values does not simply mean compromise any more than it means 
dominance of the majority's ideology or political agenda. Constitutional 
judging requires correctly understanding what the "core values" of the 
Constitution are and not confusing those values with political accommo-
dation or wishful thinking. 
The development of Fourth Amendment law over the past three de-
cades is a fascinating study of the dynamics of decisionmaking. Particu-
larly noteworthy is the Supreme Court's acceptance of "reasonableness" 
rather than probable cause, as the touchstone of the amendment. 15 Be-
cause this change has been so dramatic and sudden, it simultaneously 
calls into question the proper role of the Cqurt and provides an experi-
ment-in-progress for study. 
This Article first explores the development of a line of cases based 
on a reasonableness standard, in which the Supreme Court abandoned 
probable cause and warrants, the traditional Fourth Amendment safe-
guards, because of the presence of "special needs" that were used to jus-
tify the searches. The cases that produced and now represent this 
contemporary version of the Fourth Amendment are individually flawed 
for failing to adhere to their conceptual antecedents, and are collectively 
Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy," 34 
VAND. L. REv. 1289, 1290-91 (1981). 
13. See, e.g., Robert Emmet Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 
DEPAUL L. REv. 80 (1969); Raymond L. Spring, The Nebulous Nexus: Escobedo, Miranda 
and the New 5th Amendment, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 428 (1967); B.J. George Jr., lnte"ogation of 
Criminal Defendants- Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 169, 193 
(1966); Richard H. Kuh, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants - Some Views on Miranda v. 
Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 169, 233 (1966). 
14. See Ashdown, supra note 12, at 1290 (In the 1970s, interest in law and order and the 
general political trend to the right "resulted in a renewed tolerance for police practices at the 
expense of individual rights."). 
15. See JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A 
STUDY IN CoNSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 43-44 (1st ed. 1966); Martin Grayson, The 
Warrant Clause in Historical Context, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 107 (1987). 
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flawed by requiring that the Supreme Court interpret the amendment in 
an ad-hoc and unprincipled fashion. 
Second, this Article proposes, by using the "special needs" cases as 
examples, a method of constitutional decisionmaking more consistent 
with the realities of politics, judicial process, and constitutional ethics. 16 
Two lines of reasoning recommend this method. First, because the 
Supreme Court can act only as a court and is a branch of government 
uniquely suited to preserving the enduring principles of the Fourth 
Amendment, it has a duty to decide aspirationally with respect to those 
principles. Second, the Fourth Amendment embodies the privacy rights 
of individual citizens rather than law enforcement needs or other "special 
needs." 
I. The Development of "Special Needs" Analysis 
A. The Rise of Reasonableness 
As noted above, the Fourth Amendment's wording suggests at least 
two interpretations.17 One interpretation that seemed for many years to 
guide the Supreme Court's decisions, is that searches and seizures require 
a warrant based on probable cause.18 Nowhere does the Constitution 
expressly refer to warrantless searches and seizures, or to searches or 
seizures based on less than probable cause. 19 Nevertheless, even the most 
casual observer of criminal procedure appreciates that warrantless arrest 
or search is commonplace, and that substitutes for probable cause are 
widely employed. 
This state of affairs reflects the adoption of the alternative interpre-
tation of the Fourth Amendment, that only "reasonableness" is required. 
It also reflects that searches and seizures conducted with probable cause 
and a warrant are per se reasonable.2° Courts sometimes say that war-
rantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless the govern-
ment shows some narrowly defined exception to the warrant 
requirement. While the burden theoretically lies with the government, 
exceptions are so numerous, and defined so broadly, that the burden has 
16. By "constitutional ethics" I mean the kind of value-laden arguments described by 
Professor Philip Bobbitt. See PHILIP BOBBITI, CoNSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CoNSTITUTION 93-95 (1982). 
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Ashdown, supra note 12, at 1296 (the Fourth Amend-
ment is either a hard-and-fast, monolithic proposition or a variable and flexible provision that 
operates in degrees). 
18. See Grayson, supra note 15, at 109 (arguing that warrantless searches were not within 
the contemplation of the drafters at all); Ashdown, supra note 12, at 1296. 
19. See Grayson, supra note 15, at 109. 
20. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 4, at 43-44. 
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become one of little practical consequence. Therefore, describing search 
and seizure pursuant to a warrant asperse reasonable is now more accu-
rate than describing warrantless activity as per se unreasonable. 
The adoption of this alternative approach to Fourth Amendment 
interpretation was signalled by the truly landmark case of Terry v. 
Ohio.21 In Terry, the Court first permitted a seizure or investigative de-
tention on facts from which probable cause clearly could not be in-
ferred. 22 The facts known to Officer McFadden, along with his training 
and considerable experience, produced in his mind a reasonable suspicion 
that the men he was observing were about to commit a robbery.23 Signif-
icantly, the Court did not attempt to justify his stop of the suspects as 
something less than a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.24 Nor 
did the Court choose to characterize his level of suspicion as probable 
cause. 25 Rather, the Court embraced a view of the Fourth Amendment's 
language that it had previously avoided, and simultaneously set off down 
the doctrinal road it continues to travel. 26 
Whenever "reasonableness" has appeared in law, it has been inter-
preted by courts as an invitation to engage in more flexible, and often ad 
hoc, decisionmaking.27 Apparently determined to avoid the appearance 
21. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A 
Roadblock to Meaningful Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 42 liAsnNGs L.J. 
285, 339 (1991) (Terry's characterization as a "major development in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence" is an understatement). 
22. 392 U.S. at 22-24, 27; Ashdown, supra note 12, at 1296 (with Camara and Terry the 
Court "began to look upon the Fourth Amendment as a more flexible provision capable of 
being applied on a graduated basis"); Catuogno, supra note 5, at 587 (Terry was the "first 
significant retreat from the absolute nature of the probable cause requirement."). 
23. Terry, 392 U.S. at 1. 
24. Id. at 16-19. 
25. Id. at 7-8. While such a characterization would have been patently disingenuous, it 
would hardly have been more so than other characterizations of fact in Supreme Court deci-
sions. For example, in the regulatory search case Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967), the Supreme Court held that probable cause in code enforcement contexts could be 
established without individualized suspicion of a violation. 
26. Searches and seizures based on less than probable cause did exist before Terry v. Ohio, 
but only in exceptional cases such as international border searches. Border searches are 
unique, however, because they are justified in large part by the ancient principle of state sover-
eignty. The investigation of plain "street crime," unadorned by some supplementary justifica-
tion, was rather strictly limited by the probable cause requirement until Terry v. Ohio. 
27. If the virtue of balancing to decide reasonableness lies in the increased flexibility 
courts have to adjudicate Fourth Amendment cases, its most serious process flaw is its ad hoc 
nature. Cases like Terry v. Ohio present a wide variety of circumstances bearing on reasona-
bleness. The majority opinion reflected this by noting: "In this context we approach the issues 
in this case mindful of the limitations of the judicial function in controlling the myriad daily 
situations in which policemen and citizens confront each other on the street." Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 12. Chief Justice Warren later added in the opinion: "each case of this sort will, of course, 
have to be decided on its own facts." Id. at 30. The objection that reasonableness necessarily 
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of judicial activism or caprice (a daunting challenge when forced to de-
cide what is reasonable), the Supreme Court has labeled its adjudicatory 
process "balancing," a description that connotes objectivity and even 
suggests an approach that is scientific. 28 
What goes into the "balance" is said to be governmental interests 
(usually law enforcement) on the one hand and individual interests (lib-
erty interests, the right to be let alone) on the other.29 When the govern-
ment's interests clearly outweigh the individual's, the search or seizure is 
reasonable, otherwise not.3° For example, in Terry, the government 
sought to advance its interest in the detection and prevention of crime, an 
interest that the court found outweighed the interest of the suspects in 
being free from a brief investigative detention. The safety of the officer 
was the interest to be protected by allowing a "frisk," or pat-down of the 
outer clothing of the suspects Officer McFadden reasonably believed to 
be armed and dangerous. 
Balancing has not completely replaced probable cause as the princi-
pal means of determining reasonableness,31 but it is now well entrenched 
and growing rapidly. Reported cases in which probable cause or a war-
rant is absent now seem to rival or exceed in numbers those cases in 
which one or the other is present. If probable cause has not been elimi-
nated as a requirement, exceptions to the requirement have virtually be-
come the rule. 
An earlier experiment in deviating from the traditional probable 
cause requirement was less successful. 32 In the year preceding the Terry 
involves this kind of ad hoc adjudication is a "tip of the iceberg" objection in that numerous 
other important objections are subsumed under the rubric of ad hoc decisionmaking. See 
Thomas E. Baker, "The Right of the People to be Secure ... ·~· Toward a Metatheory of the 
Fourth Amendment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 881, 888-89 (1989) (describing difficulty in 
applying a balancing methodology). 
28. See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of 
Camera and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REv. 383, 429 (1988) (balancing requires normative judg-
ments despite efforts to give them a scientific or mathematical thrust). 
29. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26-27. For an analysis of the development of reasonableness in 
Fourth Amendment cases, see Sundby, supra note 28, at 386-97. 
30. 392 U.S. at 27. 
31. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 47 ("Balancing has been confined to 
'new' or peripheral Fourth Amendment problems."). 
32. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537-39 (1967). Camara redefined 
probable cause for administrative searches. It raised the question whether the Supreme Court 
would also alter its view of probable cause in other kinds of cases. See Dennis Stewart, Com-
ment, Constitutional Law - Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Defini-
tion of "Probable Cause" in Camera v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San 
Francisco, 36 UMKC L. REv. 111, 118 (1968) (Camara perhaps prefigures erosion of Fourth 
Amendment-safeguards in areas other than administrative search). 
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decision, the Supreme Court redefined probable cause rather than accept 
a lesser standard under a different name. 
The San Francisco Housing Code authorized employees of the Divi-
sion of Housing Inspection to enter any building or premises to conduct 
an inspection for Housing Code violations. 33 An inspector of the Divi-
sion requested that Roland Camara permit him to enter Camara's lease-
hold to conduct an inspection, and Camara refused. 34 Repeated 
subsequent demands by the inspector met with no success. Camara in-
sisted that the inspector obtain a search warrant. 35 Eventually, Camara 
was prosecuted for his refusal to comply with the Housing Code. In his 
defense, he contended that the code provision violated the Fourth 
Amendment's requirements of probable cause and a warrant. 36 
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 37 while proclaiming adherence to the 
traditional probable cause and warrant standards, the Court introduced a 
new, diminished probable cause.38 By balancing "the need to search 
against the invasion which the search entails," the Supreme Court up-
held, as reasonable, area code-enforcement inspections for which no indi-
vidualized suspicion of any code violation existed. 39 The Court cited 
government interests in support of this departure from the ordinary 
probable cause requirement, suggesting that probable cause was a much 
more malleable concept than previously believed. 40 In explaining the re-
lationship between probable cause and reasonableness, Justice White 
wrote: 
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to 
search private property is justified by a reasonable governmental 
interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a 
valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there 
is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. 
Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines appli-
cable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable 
cause requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to 
the competing public and private interests here at stake and, in so 
doing, best fu1fills the historic purpose behind the constitutional 
right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion.41 
33. Camara, 387 U.S. at 526. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 527. 
37. Id. at 523. 
38. Id. at 534-36; see Sundby, supra note 28, at 392-93. 
39. 387 U.S. at 536-37. 
40. Id. at 534-39. 
41. Id. at 539 (citations omitted). 
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What this language meant, and what the Court came to acknowl-
edge in the following term, was that probable cause and warrants were 
henceforth merely one way to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Reasona-
bleness could be achieved by gathering sufficient information to consti-
tute probable cause, and it could involve prior judicial approval, but it 
also might be achieved by a police officer acting without a warrant on 
some lesser degree of suspicion. The Supreme Court made this abun-
dantly clear in Terry v. Ohio by approving a seizure of the suspects and a 
search for weapons based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable 
cause. 42 In doing so, the Court connected probable cause to the Warrant 
Clause, implying that it was not otherwise necessary.43 Chief Justice 
Warren wrote: 
If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause 
of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether 
"probable cause" existed to justify the search and seizure which 
took place. However, that is not the case. We do not retreat from 
our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain ad-
vance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the war-
rant procedure [citations], or that in most instances failure to 
comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exi-
gent circumstances [citations]. But we deal here with an entire ru-
bric of police conduct - necessarily swift action predicated upon 
the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat - which 
historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, 
subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved 
in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general 
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. 44 
The Supreme Court's adoption of reasonableness as the ultimate test 
of Fourth Amendment compliance was accompanied by the development 
of "reasonable expectation of privacy" as the trigger for Fourth Amend-
ment scrutiny.45 In one term, the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio dimin-
ished the role of probable cause in favor of reasonableness and in Katz v. 
42. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1968). 
43. /d. at 20. 
44. /d. Justice Harlan, concurring in Terry, stated the point more succinctly: 
A police officer's right to make an on-the-street "stop" and an accompanying "frisk" 
for weapons is of course bounded by the protections afforded by the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The Court holds, and I agree, that while the right does 
not depend upon possession by the officer of a valid warrant, nor upon the existence 
of probable cause, such activities must be reasonable under the circumstances as the 
officer credibly relates them in court. 
/d. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
45. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Ashdown, supra, note 12, at 1294 
(reasonable expectation of privacy is doctrinal device used by Supreme Court to restrict scope 
of Fourth Amendment); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-
First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549 (1990). 
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United States abandoned the "bright-line" approach of applying the 
Fourth Amendment only to "constitutionally protected areas" in favor 
of a context-based reasonableness inquiry. 
The ascendancy of case-by-case adjudication may have been an at-
tempt by a self-confident Supreme Court to shape the contours of the 
Fourth Amendment in a far more sophisticated and less formalistic fash-
ion than had its predecessors.46 Whatever its original purpose, this at-
tempt eventually resulted in a diminution of individual search and 
seizure rights. For example, "reasonable expectation of privacy," a 
phrase originally designed to break courts loose from arcane property 
distinctions in deciding search issues, has been subsequently used to deny 
standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim.47 The previous "bright-
line rule" permitted any person legitimately on the premises to question 
the constitutionality of a search of those premises. It was swept aside by 
a conservatiye Court and replaced with a flexible analysis that in applica-
tion more often denies defendants the right to complain about the legality 
of searches. 48 
B. Balancing the Government's Needs Against the Citizen's: Laying the 
Groundwork 
By adopting the "reasonableness" analysis, the Supreme Court was 
able to alter the impact of the exclusionary rule without directly modify-
ing the rule.49 The "reasonableness" analysis broadly applies to deter-
46. For a comparison of the approaches taken by the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist 
courts, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights and Law 
Enforcement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11 (1988). 
47. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
48. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Professor George Kannar passionately 
condemns this development: 
The Burger Court consistently failed to recognize that exceptions of this sort can 
only be kept from swallowing the rule if they are kept narrowly - and clearly -
limited. Out of a misplaced zeal to punish individual malefactors, it began behaving 
like a neighborhood police court, cluttering its docket with insignificant cases simply 
because it could not bear the sight of particular individuals going free. In the pro-
cess, the Republican-dominated Court converted Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
into the impossibly confused quagmire it is today -piling exception upon exception, 
creating exceptions to exceptions, until not even the legal treatise writers can figure 
out exactly what the law is, or conscientious officers figure out how to act. In short, 
it was the conservative Burger Court, not the liberal Warren Court, that made search 
and seizure law a labyrinth of muddled "technicalities." And then opponents of the 
exclusionary rule seized upon the mess conservatives had themselves created as an 
excuse for abolishing the rule completely. 
George Kannar, Liberals and Crime, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 1988, at 20-21. 
49. See id.; Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 48; Ashdown, supra note 12, at 
1289. The Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule was also attacked directly. One limitation, 
the "good faith exception," permitted the introduction of illegally obtained evidence if police 
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mine the applicability of the Fourth Amendment, one's standing to 
complain about alleged violations of the amendment, or whether a viola-
tion actually occurred. In its "reasonable expectation of privacy" mani-
festation, the analysis led to the creation and validation of an entirely 
new sub-class of searches for which probable cause did not exist and war-
rants were not obtained, but which embodied a government need to 
search. 
The aborted approach of Camara v. Municipal Court foreshadowed 
some of this development. 50 The Supreme Court did not continue to al-
ter the definition of probable cause to validate various sorts of adminis-
trative searches. Instead, it began using the "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" analysis to find that such searches were not "searches" at all, or 
if they were, that they were reasonable because they were minimally 
intrusive. 51 
In the earliest of these cases, the government need was clear and the 
traditional privacy right of the persons searched questionable. In United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 52 the Supreme Court authorized a brief deten-
tion without individualized suspicion of persons at an international bor-
der. 53 Citing Camara, the majority employed a balancing of interests, 54 
found the government's need to prevent illegal immigration by control-
ling the border to be weightier than the individual's interest in not being 
detained. It also held that "[a] requirement that stops on major routes 
inland always be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical be-
cause the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized 
study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible 
carrier of illegal aliens."55 Significantly, the government did not contend 
that a checkpoint stop was not a "seizure. " 56 
acted pursuant to a warrant and in the objectively reasonable but mistaken belief that the 
warrant was valid. See U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
50. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See generally Michael J. Lacek, Comment, Camara, see, and 
Their Progeny: Another Look at Administrative Inspections Under the Fourth Amendment, 15 
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 61 (1979). 
51. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325 (1985); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 
(1987); Griffin v. Wisconsin., 483 U.S. 868 (1987); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); 
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). 
52. 428 u.s. 543 (1976). 
53. Id. at 557. 
54. Id. at 555. 
55. Id. at 557. 
56. Id. at 556. This continues to be the position of the Court. See Michigan Dep't of 
State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1990). Contrast this approach with, for example, 
Wyman v. James, a case in which the Court rejected the civil rights plaintiff's contention that 
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Although on its face it was an innocuous beginning, 57 Martinez-Fu-
erte signalled the Court's future direction in using its power to interpret 
reasonableness. The government need58 was hard to contradict, and 
sympathy with privacy rights of those crossing borders, especially illegal 
immigrants or persons involved in crime, was slight. 59 
What seemed to go virtually unnoticed by commentators at the time 
was that individualized suspicion, as well a.<; the warrant requirement, 
were held unnecessary to insure reasonableness. 60 This distinguished 
Martinez-Fuerte from both Camara, which required a warrant but not 
individualized suspicion, and Terry, which required individualized suspi-
cion but no warrant. 61 
C. "Special Needs" Meet Probable Cause 
As reasonableness, balancing, and "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" gained an increasingly prominent role in Fourth Amendment adju-
dication, the war on drugs and violent crime captured a larger share of 
the attention and concern of the American public. Border searches were 
aimed at interdicting drug traffickers as often as they were aimed at de-
tecting illegal immigrants. 62 An entire line of airport search cases devel-
a nonconsensual entry into her home was a "search." See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 
(1971). 
57. Martinez-Fuerte was innocuous only in the sense that it seemed rather unremarkable 
as an incursion on traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. Border cases are sui generis 
in the search and seizure universe, so decisions involving border searches do not necessarily 
portend changes in the usual street search. Martinez-Fuerte was not at all innocuous in its 
message that Hispanic citizens can be searched without any level of individualized suspicion if 
they venture too near the border. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551-53. 
58. The case cited statistics of illegal immigration, as well as the length of the border and 
the difficulty in effectively maintaining its security. Id. at 551-53. 
59. The Court has always treated border crossings differently. The concept of sovereignty 
and the right to protect international boundaries excused a wide variety of searches and deten-
tions that otherwise would have been condemned. Unfortunately, once precedent for such 
practices was established at the border, it was sometimes conveniently forgotten that their 
acceptance depended on the situs of the activity. 
60. Justices Brennan and Marshall certainly noticed these characteristics of the decision. 
See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 567-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Calling the holding "consis-
tent with [the majority's] purpose to debilitate Fourth Amendment protections," Justice Bren-
nan charged that the decision "virtually emptie[d] the Amendment of its reasonableness 
requirement." Id. at 568. 
61. Citing Terry v. Ohio, Justice Brennan dissented from what he saw as a departure from 
objectivity in searches based on less than probable cause. Id. at 569. In retrospect, the argu-
ment is less that the reasonableness analysis in Martinez-Fuerte waS deficient in its objectivity, 
and more that all so-called "objective" analyses of reasonableness are necessarily ad hoc and 
subjective within a broad range of outcomes between the obvious extremes. 
62. See, e.g., U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (detention of suspected 
alimentary canal smuggler at border); Leonard B. Mandell & L. Anita Richardson, Lengthy 
Detentions and Invasive Searches at the Border: In Search of the Magistrate, 28 ARIZ. L. REv. 
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oped. 63 Although the justification for the searches often included fear of 
hijacking, the prosecutions were virtually always for drug possession or 
trafficking. 64 
When a majority of the Supreme Court reversed a drug conviction 
in Florida v. Royer65 because the investigative detention at an airport 
exceeded its permissible scope, Justice Blackmun dissented. 66 In balanc-
ing the interests at stake, Justice Blackmun noted the "short-lived and 
minimal" intrusion into the defendant's privacy on the one hand, and the 
"special need for flexibility in uncovering illicit drug couriers" on the 
other.67 Although Justice Blackmun's view did not prevail in Royer, his 
notion that some "special needs" might weigh in the balance of reasona-
bleness came to life less than two years later in the school search case, 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 68 T.L.O., a freshman high school student, was 
found by a teacher smoking in the girls' rest room. 69 Because she was 
violating a school rule, T.L.O. was taken to the Assistant Vice Principal 
who questioned her about the incident.70 The student denied smoking in 
the rest room, claiming she did not smoke at all. 71 This prompted the 
Vice Principal to open T.L.O.'s purse in which he found various incrimi-
nating items, including marijuana, drug paraphernalia, money, and 
records and letters associated with drug dealing. 72 The State sought to 
adjudicate T.L.O. a delinquent, and she challenged the evidence taken 
from her purse by the Vice Principal as the fruit of an unlawful search.73 
T.L.O. concerned a special class of citizen: students,74 and only stu-
331 (1986) (growing drug trade has caused intensified interdiction efforts); Donna Wares, A 
Broader Border Patrol?, 11 CAL. LAW. 24 (1991) (federal prosecutors attempting to use Border 
Patrol in war on drugs). 
63. The Court frequently treated the airport as the functional equivalent of an interna-
tional bord~r. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); Torres v. 
Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1979). 
64. Wisotsky, supra note 2, at 907. A leading treatise on constitutional criminal proce-
dure devotes an entire subsection to "airport searches." See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. 
IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.9(h) (1985); see a/so United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 596 
(1983). 
65. 460 u.s. 491 (1983). 
66. Id. at 513 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
67. Id. at 518 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
68. 469 u.s. 325 (1985). 
69. Id. at 328. 
70. Id. at 325. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Martinez-Fuerte also involved an identifiable class, persons crossing the border. 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Specifically, the search focused on 
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dents engaged in school-related activity. The Supreme Court might have 
validated the search of T.L.O.'s purse by holding that students enjoy a 
diminished expectation of privacy in their belongings while on school 
property, but the Court rejected that approach.75 It resorted instead to a 
balancing analysis to determine whether the search was reasonable.76 
Justice White wrote, "Where a careful balancing of governmental and 
private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a 
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of prob-
able cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard."77 
Reasonableness, the T.L. 0. Court said, depends on "whether the ... 
action was justified at its inception," and whether the scope was exces-
sive. 78 Stating the "test" of reasonableness as a simple formula, however 
- something the Court began doing in Terry v. Ohio - adds nothing to 
the resolution of the issue. It merely adds to the illusion that the analysis 
is precise and scientific. In fact, the core issue is usually whether suffi-
cient suspicion existed at the time of the search, an issue now described 
as whether the search was "justified at its inception." This formula is 
impossible to apply until a court establishes the level of suspicion neces-
sary for the search. Once a court makes that decision (once it decides, 
say, that reasonable suspicion will suffice for an investigative detention), 
the formula merely describes the court's obligation to find that level of 
suspicion actually existed and to review the scope of the search in light of 
its objective. The level of suspicion necessary to justify a given search, at 
least when probable cause is not required, is a product of balancing. 79 
In New Jersey v. T.L. 0., the result of the Court's balancing was a 
determination that the search was justified at its inception because the 
Court found "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn 
up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or 
the rules of the school."80 While this result was significant, the balancing 
illegal aliens, and presumably only those "appearing" to be illegal immigrants would be sub-
jected to a border search. 
75. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 338-39; see Gerald S. Reamey, New Jersey v. T.L.o_. The 
Supreme Court's Lesson on School Searches, 16 ST. MARY's L.J. 933, 937-39 (1985). 
76. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 340-41. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 341-42 (citing Terry v. Ohio). 
79. Exactly how the Court balances competing interests is usually confined to the secrecy 
of the conference room. The Supreme Court has been notably reluctant to reveal which facts 
weighed most heavily or lightly, or to explain why some interests are necessarily more weighty 
than others. See T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
L.J. 943, 976 (1987). 
80. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 341-42. 
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itself was ultimately more important. 81 Justice White's opinion some-
what vaguely referred to "the substantial need of teachers and adminis-
trators for freedom to maintain order in the schools" as the primary 
government interest served in this case.82 But it was Justice Blackmun's 
concurrence that explained the balance in language that would later be-
come the catch phrase for a whole series of decisions. 83 Recalling his 
dissent in Florida v. Royer, 84 Justice Blackmun resurrected his view that 
the Court used balancing only when "a special law enforcement need for 
greater flexibility" existed. 85 As modified, the Justice now believed that 
"[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, be-
yond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and prob-
able-cause requirement[ s] impracticable is a court entitled to substitute 
its balancing of interests for that of the Framers."86 
The obvious and conceptually significant modification in Justice 
Blackmun's "special needs" justification for balancing was in limiting the 
analysis to needs "beyond the normal need for law enforcement."87 Ob-
viously, the "normal need for law enforcement" cannot by itself justify 
abandonment of Fourth Amendment strictures because those restraints 
are the very ones designed to limit search and seizure by law enforce-
ment. Justice Blackmun illustrated the limitation by citing Terry, a case 
in which the protection of the officer, rather than the usual investigation 
and prosecution needs of law enforcement, justified a balancing ap-
proach. 88 He neglected to note that Terry also employed balancing to 
find the detention of the suspects reasonable, 89 and that the purpose of 
investigative seizure of persons is precisely and exclusively to advance a 
"normal need for law enforcement." 
81. For a discussion of why the Court did not require probable cause and whether that 
course of action was desirable, see Reamey, supra note 75, at 946-49. 
82. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
83. See id. at 351-53 (Blackmun, J. concurring). 
84. 460 U.S. 491, 513 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
85. Id. 
86. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 351. Justice Blackmun explained that the "balancing" done by the 
Framers required that probable cause exist and that a warrant be obtained to justify a search. 
Id.; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
87. See Irene Merker Rosenberg, New Jersey v. T.L.O., Of Children and Smokescreens, 
19 FAM. L.Q. 311, 324 (1985) ("The implicated governmental interest cannot be efficient law 
enforcement because that need is historically circumscribed by the probable cause requirement 
0 0 0 ."). 
88. See T.L 0., 469 U.S. at 352. The Court recently cited protection of officers to justify a 
warrantless "protective sweep" made during an in-home arrest. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 
u.s. 325 (1990). 
89. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). 
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Ironically, two years after the T.L. 0. decision Justice Blackmun dis-
sented in O'Conner v. Ortega to the plurality's use of his own special 
needs analysis.90 In O'Conner, a plaintiff in a federal civil rights case 
alleged a Fourth Amendment violation.91 Ortega, the plaintiff, was a 
physician employed by a state hospital who was suspected of misfeasance 
in supervising a residency program.92 While the physician was on ad-
ministrative leave during the investigation, the Hospital Administrator 
entered Ortega's office and thoroughly searched his desk and file cabi-
nets, taking items that were eventually used in a termination procedure 
initiated against Ortega. 93 The Supreme Court took the case to decide 
whether plaintiff Ortega had any reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
office and its furnishings, and if so, whether the search of those places 
violated that reasonable expectation. 94 
In language reminiscent of T.L. 0., the Court held that a govern-
ment employee may reasonably expect privacy in his personal effects, and 
that a search conducted by a state employee, even if not for the purpose 
of criminal investigation, is subject to the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.95 The Court then quickly qualified the recognition of a pri-
vacy interest in personal effects by noting that because of the quasi-public 
nature of some governmental offices and their furnishings, an expectation 
of privacy by some employees may be unreasonable when a supervisor 
and not a police investigator conducts the search.96 Fortunately for him, 
Dr. Ortega had limited others' access to his desk, preserving his reason-
able expectation of privacy in its contents. 97 
Having found that Ortega did enjoy a right to privacy in his office 
furnishings, the Court then addressed whether the search was reasonable 
-that is, whether it violated the Fourth Amendment.98 The now-stan-
dard balancing approach was used, but with a twist. The Court em-
ployed Justice Blackmun's special needs analysis to justify avoidance of 
the probable cause and warrant standards.99 Citing the special need of 
public employers to promote effectiveness and efficiency and to detect 
and eliminate misfeasance, the Court concluded that the reasonable sus-
90. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 732-48 (1987) (Biackmun, J., dissenting). 
91. ld. at 709. 
92. Id. at 712. 
93. Id. at 713-14. 
94. Id. at 711-12. 
95. Id. at 714-15. Justice O'Connor wrote: "Individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment 
rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer." I d. at 717. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 718-19. 
98. Id. at 719. 
99. See id. at 719-20. 
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picion standard better promotes those aims than do probable cause and 
prior judicial approval. 100 This decision was specifically limited to 
searches conducted as part of an investigation of "work-related miscon-
duct" rather than criminal activity, or some "noninvestigatory work-re-
lated purpose such as to retrieve a needed file." 101 
Justice Blackmun, author of the "special needs" formulation, criti-
cized its misuse by the plurality in O'Connor.102 He explained that bal-
ancing is appropriate only when "the practical realities of a particular 
situation suggest that a government official cannot obtain a warrant 
based upon probable cause without sacrificing the ultimate goals to 
which a search would contribute."103 In judging Dr. Ortega's case, he 
asserted, the plurality ignored whether a special need justified the balanc-
ing approach; the plurality balanced without first finding that the goals 
of the hospital could be advanced only by dispensing with the formula 
for reasonableness struck by the Framers. 104 
Justice Blackmun finally wrote on this issue for the majority in New 
York v. Burger. 105 The defendant in Burger owned an automobile sal-
vage business. Acting pursuant to a New York state regulatory scheme 
permitting warrantless police inspections of vehicles, parts, and records, 
police searched Burger's business and discovered stolen vehicles and 
parts, along with a wheelchair and a walker. 106 
The Court characterized the auto salvage business as a "closely reg-
ulated industry" in which owners like Burger have a lesser expectation of 
privacy.107 A reduced expectation of privacy, in turn, means that "the 
warrant and probable-cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional 
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search, 
have lessened application in this context."108 Justice Blackmun then 
concluded that, "as in other situations of special need, where the privacy 
interests of the owner are weakened and the government interests in reg-
ulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened, a warrantless 
inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable within the 
100. See id. at 724. The Court expressly refused to decide whether "individualized suspi-
cion" is necessary in such searches, finding that it existed in the present case. Id. 
101. Id. at 726. 
102. See id. at 741-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
103. Id. at 741 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
104. See id. at 742 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
105. 482 u.s. 691 (1987). 
106. Id. at 695-96. 
107. Id. at 700-07. The Court recognized, however, as it had in T.L.O. and Ortega, that 
the defendant did retain some reasonable expectation of privacy in commercial premises. I d. at 
699. 
108. Id. at 702 (citation omitted). 
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment."109 The opinion then described the 
criteria required to justify a warrantless inspection. These criteria in-
cluded: the existence of a '"substantial' government interest that informs 
the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made"; a dem-
onstration that the search is "necessary to further [the] regulatory 
scheme"; and a statutory scheme that "in terms of the certainty and reg-
ularity of its application, [must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate 
substitute for a warrant." 110 
Presumably Justice Blackmun intended these criteria to demon-
strate the special need for warrantless inspections of vehicle salvage deal-
ers. Instead, the criteria merely stated standards by which warrantless 
inspections would be judged. The opinion contains only a brief nod in 
the direction of "special need" by asserting virtually without discussion 
that "frequent and unannounced" inspections are necessary to stem the 
flow of stolen vehicles and parts through junkyards. 111 
Any reasons why an administrative warrant scheme like that re-
quired in Camara would prevent or even hamper "frequent and unan-
nounced" inspections are conspicuously absent from the opinion. 
Ironically, this is the very kind of omission that caused Justice Blackmun 
to dissent in Ortega. 112 Moreover, if the special needs must extend "be-
yond the normal need for law enforcement,"113 catching car thieves can-
not justify dispensing with warrants and probable cause. 114 
During the same term in which the Court decided New York v. Bur-
ger, Justice Blackmun made clear his unwillingness to bypass the warrant 
requirement simply because special needs justified a reduced level of sus-
picion. 115 In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 116 the majority employed the now-fa-
miliar approach to a search of a probationer's home. Wisconsin law 
permitted the warrantless search of a probationer's home if "reasonable 
grounds" existed to believe the probationer possessed contraband.117 Po-
109. Id. (citation omitted). 
110. Id. at 702-03 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600-02 (1981)). 
111. See id. at 710. 
112. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 741-44 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
113. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
114. The New York Court of Appeals held the search unreasonable, in part because the 
statutory scheme permitted searches "undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality and 
not to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme." People v. Burger, 493 N.E.2d 926, 929 
(N.Y. 1986). The Court concluded, however, that "[t]he asserted 'administrative schem[e]' 
here [is], in reality, designed simply to give the police an expedient means of enforcing penal 
sanctions for possession of stolen property." 493 N.E. 2d at 929; New York v. Burger, 482 
u.s. 691, 698 (1987). 
115. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
116. Id. at 868. 
117. Id. at 870-71. 
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lice had received information that the probationer, Griffin, might have 
guns in his apartment, and a handgun was found in the ensuing search of 
the residence. 118 Citing the special needs attendant to supervision and 
rehabilitation of probationers, the Court held that "reasonable grounds" 
existed to justify the search, and that the search did not require prior 
judicial approval. 119 
Justice Blackmun, echoing his complaint in O'Connor v. Ortega, 120 
dissented from the majority's failure to recognize that finding special 
needs is a "threshold determination.'>121 He explained, "The presence of 
special law enforcement needs justifies resort to the balancing test, but it 
does not preordain the necessity of recognizing exceptions to the warrant 
and probable-cause requirements."122 
For the dissenters, special needs in this case supported use of balanc-
ing, a term that had come to be synonymous with "reasonable suspi-
cion.''123 But special needs did not support the search of a home without 
at least an administrative warrant of the sort required by Camara. 124 
The majority, on the other hand, had begun to decide cases as if special 
needs did "preordain the necessity of recognizing exceptions to the war-
rant and probable-cause requirements."125 
D. "Special Needs" Trump Probable Cause (and Warrants and 
Individualized Suspicion) 
It appeared after Griffin v. Wisconsin that the formulaic incantation 
"special needs," though always hedged about with assurances that the 
defendant's class indeed enjpyed at least some reasonable expectation of 
privacy, inevitably led to an alternative version of reasonableness and to 
the abandonment of probable cause and the warrant requirement. The 
Court was always careful to balance the interests to determine whether 
the search was reasonable, but once special needs were found, the balance 
inevitably tipped in favor of reasonableness. 126 Following Griffin and 
Burger, Justice Blackmun's creation was effectively expropriated by those 
members of the Court who wished to use it -but without the limitations 
118. /d. 
119. /d. at 873-75. 
120. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 741-42 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
121. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 881 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). 
122. /d. at 881-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
123. /d. 
124. See id. at 882-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967). 
125. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
126. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
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intended by its creator - to skirt the probable-cause and warrant re-
quirements. 127 The analysis produced the same result whether the suspi-
cion was individualized or not, 128 and whether the place searched was 
open to others or intensely private. 129 · 
The most recent decisions of the Supreme Court illustrate the scope 
of search justified by special governmental needs. Two of these cases, 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab 130 and Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives Ass'n, 131 resulted directly from the "war on 
drugs." Justice Marshall, writing with characteristic candor in his Skin-
ner dissent, framed the issue in precisely these terms: 
The issue in this case is not whether declaring a war on illegal 
drugs is good public policy. The importance of ridding our society 
of such drugs is, by now, apparent to all. Rather, the issue here is 
whether the Government's deployment in that war of a particu-
larly draconian weapon - the compulsory collection and chemical 
testing of railroad workers' blood and urine - comports with the 
Fourth Amendment. 132 
In both cases, employees were required to submit to drug testing, and in 
both cases the Supreme Court found that a special need, ostensibly apart 
from law enforcement, justified the search. 133 The Court had not hesi-
tated to validate a warrantless search of the defendant's home based on 
reasonable suspicion in Griffin, and it showed no reluctance in Von Raab 
and Skinner to extend that search to employees' bodily fluids. 134 If any 
doubt remained after Griffin whether the Court would draw some line 
based on the nature of the place to be searched, that doubt seems re-
solved by Von Raab and Skinner. The remaining protection of private 
places lies, if anywhere, in the balancing that was intended to follow a 
finding of special need. However, if the balancing is formalistic and the 
result "preordained," as Justice Blackmun suggested. in his dissenting 
opinion in Griffin, the protections afforded by probable cause and prior 
127. See infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
128. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (routine stops at border 
checkpoints); Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 (search of home of probationer believed to have guns at his 
residence). 
129. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (search of government employee's of-
fice); Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 (search of probationer's home). 
130. 489 u.s. 656 (1989). 
131. 489 u.s. 602 (1989). 
132. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
133. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66 (special needs other than law enforcement justify 
drug testing); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21 (1989) (special needs other than law enforcement 
justify mandatory urinalysis of railroad workers). 
134. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
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judicial approval were effectively stripped away. 135 In both Von Raab 
and Skinner, the Court preceded its analysis, as usual, by conceding that 
urine tests are searches subject to the Fourth Amendment. 136 
The employees to be searched in Von Raab 137 were agents of the 
United States Customs Service. 138 Those who were engaged in drug in-
terdiction or enforcement, who carried firearms, or who handled classi-
fied material were required to submit to drug screening. 139 The Court 
justified its resort to balancing to determine the reasonableness of the 
intrusion by the Customs Service's need to "deter drug use among those 
eligible for promotion to sensitive positions with the Service and to pre-
vent the promotion of drug users to thos~ positions."140 
Ultimately, the Court found the intrusion reasonable despite the 
lack of individualized suspicion or, indeed, any suspicion at all. 141 Aban-
doning individualized suspicion is seemingly merited only in cases that 
involve credible evidence demonstrating a substantial incidence of con-
duct related to the special need within a narrowly defined and easily rec-
ognizable class. But the Customs Service failed to document any 
significant drug use by its employees.142 Notwithstanding this seemingly 
insurmountable constitutional obstacle, the Court found suspicionless, 
warrantless drug testing "reasonable" because drug abuse is a "pervasive 
social problem"143 and Customs Service employees have only a slight ex-
pectation of privacy, which is not infringed significantly by the taking of 
urine samples. 144 
135. Id. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
136. Id. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 617. This pattern of analysis is at least as old as Terry 
v. Ohio. The Court acknowledges that the activity is indeed a search subject to Fourth 
Amendment constraints, but concludes on balance that those constraints are inapplicable in 
the case before the Court. Professor Burkofflikens this approach to George Orwell's "1984": 
"You have Fourth Amendment rights, of course, the Court tells us. You don't get them here, 
however, we are also told. Sound familiar? Doublethink." Burkoff, supra note 4, at 555. 
137. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656. 
138. Id. at 659. 
139. Id. at 660-61. The case was remanded respecting those employees who had access to 
classified material. 
140. Id. at 666. 
141. See supra notes, at 137-39. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the use of road-
blocks to detain drivers without individualized suspicion. See Michigan Dep't of State Police 
v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1990); Strossen, supra note 21. · 
142. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
143. See id. at 674; id. at 683 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
144. Id. at 670-72; see Alyssa C. Westover, Note, National Treasury Employees Union v. 
Von Raab-Will the War Against Drugs Abrogate Constitutional Guarantees?, 17 PEPP. L. 
REv. 793, 814 (1990) (individual privacy rights of no weight in light of compelling government 
interests). 
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Railroad employees were the subjects of the drug tests in Skinner, 145 
and the special need was "to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad 
operations that result from impairment of employees by alcohol or 
drugs."146 The Court noted that these tests were not intended "to assist 
in the prosecution of employees,"147 but the Court conceded that the pro-
vision "might be read broadly to authorize the release of biological sam-
ples to law enforcement authorities."148 Regarding urine samples, the 
Court wrote: 
It is not disputed ... that chemical analysis of urine, like that of 
blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an em-
ployee, including whether she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. 
Nor can it be disputed that the process of collecting the sample to 
be tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitor-
ing of the act of urination, itself implicates privacy interests. . ... 
Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes 
upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as 
reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unani-
mously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be deemed 
searches under the Fourth Amendment. 149 
Despite the admittedly intrusive nature of the testing procedure, 150 the 
Court concluded that neither individualized suspicion, nor prior judicial 
approval of the procedure151 is required to conduct such searches. 152 
E. The Impact of "Special Needs" Analysis op Fourth Amendment 
Decisionmaking 
This series of cases reflects an important reshaping of Fourth 
Amendment protections. If it also portends the future of privacy 
rights, 153 it will be a future very unlike the past. 154 In several distinct 
145. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); see Catuogna, supra 
note 5. 
146. 49 C.P.R. § 219.1(a) (1987); see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602. 
147. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21. 
148. Id. at 621 n.5. The majority also noted that the regulations did not explicitly permit 
use of the test results by law enforcement agencies, and that the labor organizations had not 
shown that the regulations were pretextual. Id. The Court expressly avoided deciding 
whether proof of regular reporting of positive results to law enforcement agencies would un-
dercut the avowed administrative nature of the seizure. Id. 
149. See id. at 617. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 623. 
152. Id. at 633. 
153. Cf. Strossen, supra note 21, at 369 (Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz heralds a 
"new epoch of limited Supreme Court protection for individual rights"). Professor Sundby 
believes the risk is great that the interpretation of reasonableness will lead away from the 
original premises of the Fourth Amendment. See Sundby, supra note 28, at 440. 
154. What Learned Hand remarked in an earlier context is apropos of the modem trend: 
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ways, these cases have quietly but surely altered some of the most funda-
mental assumptions about the intent of the Framers, and they have laid 
the groundwork for even more sweeping change. 
In the pre-Terry world, courts took seriously the command that 
searches and seizures be predicated on probable cause and warrants. 155 
The warrant requirement slowly but surely gave way to numerous excep-
tions, which are now the rule. 156 Incursions on the integrity of the exclu-
sionary rule157 and procedural limitations like standing have reduced the 
likelihood that Fourth Amendment violations will be vindicated. 158 
Less obviously and more slowly, perhaps because it was considered 
the indispensable "core" of the Fourth Amendment, probable cause also 
lost its central role in protecting privacy. 159 The degradation of probable 
cause may have been inevitable once the Supreme Court announced that 
"reasonableness" is the real touchstone of the amendment. But if balanc-
ing permits a reduction of suspicion levels necessary to justify a search, it 
does not require it. Reasonableness does not necessarily mean that the 
concept of individualized suspicion is disposable. 160 And special needs 
are not always more weighty than individual privacy rights. 161 
From one perspective, the Supreme Court has created subclasses of 
the population entitled to less constitutional protection than the rest. 162 
If the prosecution of crime is to be conducted with so little regard for that protection 
which centuries of English law have given to the individual, we are indeed at the 
dawn of a new era; and much that we have deemed vital to our liberties, is a delusion. 
United States v. Di Re, 159 F.2d 818, 820 (2d Cir. 1947). 
155. See Catuogna, supra note 5, at 582 (''This idyllic time has passed .... "). One author 
suggests that the pre-Terry Court avoided a reasonableness analysis because of its "wariness of 
the potential open-endedness of a Fourth Amendment test based on reasonableness." Sundby, 
supra note 28, at 387. 
156. See Kannar, supra note 48, at 20-21. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 
981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
157. Strossen, supra note 21, at 331 (reduced scope of exclusionary rule is one example of 
erosion of privacy and liberty rights). 
158. See generally Ashdown, supra note 12. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 
(1978); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 
(1980). 
159. Strossen, supra note 21, at 332 (until1968 Supreme Court had uniformly insisted on 
probable cause). 
160. Id. at 362 (reasonableness does not necessarily imply low level of judicial review). 
161. Professors Wasserstrom and Seidman effectively argue in favor of employing a con-
text-based interpretation of reasonableness. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 44-
52. I disagree with their premise that the Supreme Court has, for the most part, eschewed a 
balancing approach. The Court continues to move deliberately toward such an approach, in 
fact, for many of the reasons Wasserstrom and Seidman cite as problematical. 
162. This does not mean that equality of Fourth Amendment protection satisfies the Con-
stitution's command. Despite the inference that might be drawn from recent decisions, I do 
not subscribe to the theory that any level of suspicion, perhaps even none at all, is reasonable if 
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Probationers, automobile salvage dealers, government workers, railway 
employees, certain customs agents, and school children no longer enjoy 
the safeguards of probable cause and warrants. 163 
The intrusions approved by the Court into the privacy of members 
of these subclasses are not minimal. As Justice Marshall noted in Skin-
ner, they implicate "each of the four categories of searches enumerated in 
the Fourth Amendment: searches of 'persons,' 'houses,' 'papers,' and 'ef-
fects.' " 164 Moreover, they include intrusions into the most private 
places of the suspects. 165 Regarding the extent of the intrusion permitted 
by the Court, Justice Marshall wrote: 
Until today, it was conceivable that, when a Government search 
was aimed at a person and not simply the person's possessions, 
balancing analysis had no place. No longer: with nary a word of 
explanation or acknowledgment of the novelty of its approach, the 
majority extends the "special needs" framework to a regulation in-
volving compulsory blood withdrawal and urinary excretion, and 
chemical testing of the bodily fluids collected through these 
procedures. 166 
None of the "special needs" cases required a warrant, and in the 
earlier decisions only reasonable suspicion was necessary. The most re-
cent balancing cases completely abandon the need for suspicion. 167 Not-
ing this departure from what had seemed settled law, Justice Marshall 
wrote: 
... [U]ntil today, it was conceivable that a prerequisite for surviv-
ing "special needs" analysis was the existence of individualized sus-
picion. No longer: in contrast to the searches in T.L.O., O'Connor, 
and Griffin, which were supported by individualized evidence sug-
gesting the culpability of the persons whose property was searched, 
the regulatory regime upheld today requires the postaccident col-
lection and testing of the blood and urine of all covered employees 
- even if every member of this group gives every indication of 
applied evenly to all persons. See Strossen, supra note 21, at 370-71 (Fourth Amendment 
protects individual privacy rights, not just equality of application). 
163. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (search of probationer's home); New 
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (search of automobile salvage yard); O'Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 602 (1989) (search of government employee's desk); Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (search of railway workers' urine); Nat'l Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (search of agents' urine); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325 (1985) (search of student's purse). 
164. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
165. See, e.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 (search of probationer's home); O'Connor, 480 U.S. 709 
(search of doctor's desk and file cabinet); T.LO., 469 U.S. 325 (search of student's purse); Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (search of agents' urine). 
166. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 640 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
167. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; Michigan Dept. of State 
Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). 
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sobriety and attentiveness. 168 
This brief survey shows the power of the incantation "special 
needs." Perhaps most troubling, the potential application of this mighty 
talisman is virtually unlimited. If the special needs doctrine was origi-
nally intended to meet administrative goals unrelated to law enforce-
ment, it has certainly not been restricted to these applications. 169 The 
Court's opinions give no indication that evidence discovered during these 
searches is unavailable in the prosecution of criminal activity uncovered 
by the search. ·In fact, evidence found in administrative searches has 
often been used in criminal prosecution. 170 
Moreover, the Court has made no serious effort to limit the special 
needs analysis to the "threshold" inquiry envisaged by Justice Black-
mun. 171 It is not merely a way to determine whether ad-hoc balancing is 
appropriate in lieu of applying the Framer's balance. Instead, special 
needs, once found by the Court, have always led to ad-hoc balancing, 
have always resulted in a reduced level of suspicion, have always elimi-
nated the need for a warrant, and have always resulted in a finding that a 
search was "reasonable."172 Justice Marshall, dissenting in Skinner, ob-
served this ineluctable progression: 
In the four years since this Court, in T.L.O., first began recogniz-
ing "special needs" exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, the clar-
ity of Fourth Amendment doctrine has been badly distorted, as the 
Court has eclipsed the probable-cause requirement in a patchwork 
quilt of settings: public school principals' searches of students' be-
longings; public employers' searches of employees' desks; and pro-
168. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 640 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
169. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (salvage yard search upheld for purpose 
of discovering stolen car parts); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (probationer found 
in possession of handgun convicted of possession of firearm by convicted felon). 
170. See Griffin, 483 U.S. 868; Burger, 482 U.S. 691; T.LO., 469 U.S. 325 (evidence used in 
delinquency hearing); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (drugs found in vehicle 
inventory search). The Supreme Court suggested in a footnote to Skinner that it might assess 
an administrative drug testing scheme in a more traditional way, presumably by employing 
probable cause or at least reasonable suspicion, if there was a "persuasive showing" that the 
testing program is pretextual. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5. Justice Kennedy wrote: 
We leave for another day the question whether routine use in criminal prosecutions 
of evidence obtained pursuant to the administrative scheme would give rise to an 
inference of pretext, or otherwise impugn the administrative nature of the Agency's 
program. 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621. See also Dennis Stewart, Comment, Constitutional Law-Adminis-
trative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Definition of "Probable Cause" in Camera v. 
Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 36 UMKC L. REv. 111 (1968) 
(administrative and criminal searches may be inseparable). 
171. See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 351-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 
U.S. 709, 741-42 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
172. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 637-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Winter 1992] "SPECIAL NEEDS" AND PROBABLE CAUSE 
bation officers' searches of probationers' homes. Tellingly, each 
time the Court has found that "special needs" counseled ignoring 
the literal requirements of the Fourth Amendment for such full-
scale searches in favor of a formless and unguided "reasonable-
ness" balancing inquiry, it has concluded that the search in ques-
tion satisfied that test. 173 
321 
If, as it appears, the label "special needs" is so potent and the power 
it implies so unrestricted, extraordinary care must be taken in applying 
the label. However, the same Supreme Court that fashioned the special 
needs analysis and has consistently applied it to find searches reasonable, 
does this labeling.174 The Court neatly validates searches by the expedi-
ent of finding some special need for them. In a world of special criminal 
justice needs, perhaps most frequently seen in the war on drugs, it is 
troubling that permission to search depends only on finding such a need. 
Even more troubling, the task falls to judges who have before them at the 
time of their decision probative evidence of guilt they are being asked to 
suppress. 175 
Persons entering or now within the subclasses for which special 
needs have been found to exist are at least constructively aware that any 
future expectation of privacy is unreasonable, diminished, or inappropri-
ate for prior judicial review. Those persons in situations and subclasses 
as yet unlabeled are scarcely better off. Although the Supreme Court 
may never have cause to decide whether some special need warrants 
abandonment of traditional safeguards respecting their subclass, the 
trend of recent decisions affords little reason to expect that the Court will 
forebear in the face of another opportunity to do individual justice.176 
173. ld. at 639 (citations omitted). 
174. Id. at 639; see Wisotsky, supra note 2. 
Case-by-case analysis obscures the larger social context: the government's relentless 
drive against the drug supply generates the pressures to test and expand its enforce-
ment powers. Moreover, when the Supreme Court "balances" the collective interest 
in "effective" law enforcement against the individual's interest in due process and 
personal liberty, the right of privacy must generally lose out to the weightier social 
interest, especially if there is a shared perception of a drug "epidemic." 
Wisotsky, supra note 2, at 909. 
175. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 48 ("[B]alancing tests are notoriously 
manipulable. For the very reason that they do not provide bright lines, they are subject to 
slippage when the Court is under political pressure to crack down on criminals."). This troub-
ling aspect of criminal case adjudication is certainly not limited to special needs cases. The 
same criticism can be made anytime a court reviews probable cause or reasonable suspicion in 
a criminal case. 
176. The dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall in Skinner captures this concern: 
As this Court has long recognized, the Framers intended the provisions of that 
. Clause - a warrant and probable cause - to "provide the yardstick against which 
official searches and seizures are to be measured." Without the content which those 
provisions give to the Fourth Amendment's overarching command that searches and 
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Indeed, the result of Supreme Court scrutiny of administrative-like 
searches has become so predictable177 that it might be said any expecta-
tion of privacy entertained by members of these subclasses is already ob-
jectively unreasonable. 178 
II. Constitutional Decisionmaking 
The development of special needs analysis, like the development of 
other strains of analysis, 179 should not merely be noted and criticized, 
and then left without consideration of what it says about the role of the 
Supreme Court and constitutional adjudication. Critics and commenta-
tors understandably tend to avoid these broader issues because they may 
detract from the impact of more (ocused criticism, because conceptualiz-
ing and analyzing global issues is simply too daunting, or maybe because 
they view the effort as quixotic. 180 The Supreme Court's use of special 
needs analysis is unsound as applied to determine reasonableness, but it 
is more important to understand why it is also unsound as a mode of 
constitutional interpretation. 
A. Obfuscation as a Judicial Device 
Stand back from the special needs cases - and also from the war-
rant exception, the good-faith exception, and the standing cases - and 
note the relatively consistent methods employed by the Court to decide 
cases over the past decade.181 One of these, obfuscation, plays an impor-
tant part in search cases in which the Court radically departed from 
seizures be "reasonable," the Amendment lies virtually devoid of meaning, subject to 
whatever content shifting judicial majorities, concerned about the problems of the 
day, choose to give to that supple term. 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 637 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted). See id. at 637-41 (special needs analysis always leads to a finding of 
reasonableness). 
177. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 639 (search found reasonable each time special needs 
employed). 
178. See Strossen, supra note 21, at 356-57 (as society tolerates more varied forms of search 
and seizure, "reasonable expectation of privacy" narrows, and more government intrusions lie 
beyond the Fourth Amendment). This concern crossed the Canadian border with the adop-
tion of a reasonable expectation of privacy approach to Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. See Murray, Note, The "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test" And the Scope of 
Protection Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure Under Section 8 of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, 18 O'ITAWA L. REv. 25, 30 (1986) (government could manipulate subjective 
privacy expectations). 
179. See Saltzburg, supra note 2 (open fields doctrine as attack on the Fourth 
Amendment). 
180. For an excellent example of scholars tackling the "broader issues," see Wasserstrom & 
Seidman, supra note 11. 
181. See Ashdown, supra note 12. 
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traditional doctrine. 182 
Perhaps the most insidious example of this practice is the Court's 
use of "bright-line rules" to diminish the effect of the exclusionary rule. 
The touted virtue of simplification of search and seizure rules is that the 
police are caught unawares by overly technical legalistic doctrines, which 
frustrate both legitimate aims of law enforcement and common-sense no-
tions of fairness. The Supreme Court never tires of noting that the public 
is harmed in cases in which evidence is excluded merely because "the 
constable has blundered." The Justice invoking this venerable phrase in-
variably omits any discussion of whether the constable should have blun-
dered, or whether society must accept that constables will necessarily 
blunder, or why it is that the State should not pay a price when the 
constable does blunder. The unstated assumption is that constables, like 
the rest of us, are human and given to honest mistakes for which they 
should not be held accountable. This kind of compassion is conspicu-
ously absent from the Court's view of persons convicted or accused of 
criminal acts. 183 
As an example of this over-simplified view of search and seizure 
rules, assume that a purposive approach to the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception could be replaced by an easily applied bright-line rule. Fourth 
Amendment protections theoretically would be more uniformly assured, 
and the exclusionary rule would be invoked less often. Presumably moti-
vated by this reasoning, the Supreme Court formulated just such a rule in 
vehicle search cases. 184 The bright-line rule of search incident to arrest 
from a vehicle first appeared in New York v. Belton, 185 in which the 
Court approved the search of closed containers within the passenger 
compartment of an automobile without regard for whether the area 
searched was within the immediate control of the arrestee. The purpo-
sive application of search incident to arrest originated more than a dec-
ade before Belton with Chime! v. California, 186 in which the Court 
182. As Felix Cohen noted, "confusion is a more potent source of evil than is error." FE-
LIX CoHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS Ch. 20 (1933). See Kannar, supra note 
48, at 21 (opponents of exclusionary rule have used confused the state of search and seizure 
law as excuse to abolish the rule). 
183. This approach implies that law enforcement officers simply lack the capacity to under-
stand and apply any but the simplest rules. My lengthy experience as a police legal advisor 
and law enforcement consultant does not support this view. 
184. The purposive nature of Chime! had been eroded prior to the decision in Belton by 
U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), in which the Court refused to suppress evidence seized 
from the person of the arrestee despite the fact that the offense for which the defendant had 
been arrested did not involve a weapon, and was not the kind of crime for which physical 
evidence exists. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
185. 453 u.s. 454 (1981). 
186. 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
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restricted search incident to arrest to those areas within the immediate 
control of the arrestee and explained that the purpose justifying the war-
rantless search of this area was to locate weapons dangerous to the police 
and to prevent the destruction of evidence. Rather than relying on the 
purposes justifying and limiting the scope of residence search-incident-to-
arrest cases, the Supreme Court adopted an "area" approach in vehicle 
search cases in Belton. 187 The area of the .vehicle that may be searched is 
the passenger compartment, including closed containers found within 
it. 188 This result is not dependent on the arrestee's ability to reach within 
the compartment to obtain a weapon or destructible evidence, which was 
the previous justification for abandonment of the warrant requirement 
for a search incident to arrest in the home.189 In theory, the area rule is 
easier for police officers to apply because they need not consider the 
dimensions of the arrestee's actual area of control. They need not even 
recall why the Supreme Court gave them permission to search without a 
warrant in the first place. 
The reality is that adoption of a bright-line rule for search incident 
to arrest has resulted in an increased chance that "the constable will 
blunder" in a way that violates privacy rights, and in a reduced likeli-
hood that the exclusionary remedy for that violation will be available. 
Whereas the previous search-incident-to-arrest rule informed the police 
officer of both the scope of the area in which search was permitted and 
the policy reasons justifying the search, the bright-line versions of the 
rule have been cut loose from doctrinal and policy moorings, leaving the 
officer to guess whether the Court will approve the search. An example 
of this dilemma is the case of the contraband found within a locked 
container in the passenger compartment of a vehicle from which the 
driver has been taken and arrested. If the purpose of the warrant excep-
tion is to prevent the arrestee from retrieving a weapon or destructible 
evidence, the officer has some basis for deciding whether a search of the 
locked compartment may be made without a warrant. However, under 
the bright-line approach of Belton, it is impossible to decide by the appli-
cation of logic whether the formalistic holding of Belton extends beyond 
the factual limits of the opinion.190 By freeing itself from the doctrinal 
limitations of the rule, the Court is now positioned to define, ad hoc, 
which areas are susceptible to a search incident to arrest. Most notably, 
187. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61. 
188. See id. 
189. Chime!, 395 U.S. at 762-63. 
190. See John M. A. DiPippa, Is the Fourth Amendment Obsolete?-Restating the Fourth 
Amendment in Functional Terms, 22 GoNz. L. REv. 483, 522 (1987-88) (Belton approach 
faulty for being too open-ended). 
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this diminution in clarity and certainty has been accomplished by citing 
the need for simplification. 
In other areas of criminal procedure, bright-line rules that burden 
prosecution have been replaced by purposive rules that are much less 
certain in application. For instance, in the standing cases, the rule has 
changed from a more bright-line approach granting standing to persons 
"legitimately on the premises" and automatic standing to those charged 
with possession of contraband, to a more purposive analysis of whether 
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place 
searched. 191 Under the contemporary view, a vehicle passenger might or 
might not have standing to complain about contraband found in the pas-
senger compartment depending on whether he or she had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the place searched. 192 It is usually easier to 
determine whether a vehicle passenger was "legitimately on the prem-
ises" during the search, but that rule also made it much more likely that 
the passenger would have standing to complain about the search. 193 
All of this may illustrate only that it is as easy to do the wrong thing 
for the right reason as it is to do the right thing for the wrong reason. 
Efficiency, 194 clarity, and simplicity are all virtues, especially in a crimi-
nal justice system seemingly beset with inefficiency, confusion, and com-
plexity, all of which contribute to the criminal going free. Some 
problems, however, are not simple or easy; they are not clear; and there 
is no efficient195 way to solve them. If the rule is made simpler and easier 
to apply, the complexity of the problem must be managed by another 
component of the problem-solving dynamic; the complexity does not just 
vanish because of a simple response. In recent constitutional criminal 
procedure cases, the Supreme Court has effectively allocated the burden 
191. See generally LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 64, at§§ 9.1, -.2. 
192. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1978). 
193. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1960). 
194. Justice Stewart cautioned against the exaltation of efficiency in his opinion in Mincey 
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978): 
Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never 
by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. The investigation of crime 
would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amend-
ment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a 
person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum 
simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law. 
I d. at 393 (citation omitted). This idea is not a new one. Blackstone observed that "delays and 
little inconveniences in the forms of justice are the price that all free nations must pay for their 
liberty in more substantial matters .... " 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 350 
(11th ed. 1791). 
195. By "efficient," I mean without considerable "cost." Efficiency as maximization of 
utility can, of course, be achieved. 
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of managing the residual complexity to the trial courts, eschewing the 
rule of law (i.e., doctrine) for the rule of judges.196 
The special needs cases illustrate this point especially well, but in a 
way different from the search-incident-to-arrest cases. Here, the pre-
Terry rule was the bright-line one: Probable cause and a warrant are re-
quired in all search cases unless a well-defined exception to the warrant 
requirement exists. 197 The adoption of "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" as the definition of a search, 198 and the subsequent reliance on 
reasonableness rather than probable cause as the touchstone of the 
amendment did not signal a simplification in approach.199 Rather, it sig-
nalled the Court's arrogation of power by substituting its version of 
Fourth Amendment protection for that of the Framers. 200 Although by 
itself that is assuredly a big step, once made it permits the Court to 
foreverafter freely reformulate search and arrest law. 
196. See Ashdown, supra note 12, at 1310 (the Court's new privacy formulation amounts 
to an abdication to state judges on Fourth Amendment issues). The Supreme Court has 
shifted the problems of ad-hoc decisionmaking to the lower courts. Rather than adhere to 
some relatively fixed rule or doctrine that is more or less interpreted consistently, it has cut 
search law free of many of its doctrinal moorings, leaving the trial courts to sort out what 
"reasonable" means in each new situation. 
Ironically, a Court considered the most conservative in decades has practiced this brand 
of activism. Judicial activism may truly be in the eye of the beholder; judges without the 
power to effect change can always criticize those in other philosophical camps for being ac-
tivist. That is, most judges would probably agree that the "right" judges should be permitted 
to "make" law while the "wrong" judges should not. 
197. Id. 
198. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (reasonable expectation of privacy 
misconstrued by Supreme Court). There are three distinct ways in which "reasonableness" 
comes into play in Fourth Amendment cases. The first two are threshold issues. One is the 
issue of standing, which is decided by asking whether the defendant had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the place or thing searched. The second is whether there was any "search" 
at all. If the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy-as in the Ciraolo!plain view 
situation, the defendant also cannot complain. This is not because he lacks standing, but be-
cause there was no Fourth Amendment activity by the state. The third use of reasonableness is 
in interpreting the amendment itself. A "search" of someone with "standing" must be reason-
able to avoid the exclusionary sanction. 
199. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 48 ("[l]ndividualized, retrospective 
balancing provides little prospective direction to police officers, who presumably need clear 
rules to guide their decisions."); Ashdown, supra note 12, at 1309-10 (elasticity of Court's view 
of privacy "is at best confusing and at worst exhibits infidelity to the privacy notions expressed 
in Katz). 
200. Opponents of this view will argue that no arrogation of power occurred because the 
Court correctly interpreted the constitutional scheme to vest in it the responsibility to decide 
what is reasonable. I leave to my colleagues who are constitutional law historians the argu-
ments why this reading is not correct. See Grayson, supra note 15; Strossen, supra note 21. 
Suffice it to say that I am not persuaded that the Framers intended to reduce the imperative of 
the Fourth Amendment to a mere alternative suggestion. 
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B. The Inefficiency and Unpredictability of Ad-Hoc Decisionmaking 
The preceding characterizations of the Court's decisionmaking do 
not require the conclusion that the Court has acted extra-constitution-
ally201 or, if it has, that it should not have done so. They do, however, 
demand consideration of whether its recent approach is appropriate or 
desirable. 
One entirely pragmatic reason to regret the consolidation and con-
centration of decisionmaking power at the highest level of the judiciary is 
its inherent inefficiency. Though it may appear more efficient to locate 
the final and "true" balancing determination in the Supreme Court, the 
burden will ultimately be unbearable. The Court is unable, 202 and pre-
sumably unwilling, to decide every case in which balancing is required.203 
Even if the cases accepted by the Court represent only the "new" situa-
tions (or subclasses), the docket simply cannot absorb the "protean vari-
ety"204 of cases demanding their turn at the scales. 
At least two alternatives exist that can alleviate this impact on the 
Court. The first is to disperse decisionmaking power among the lower 
courts, as is done now in cases determining, for example, whether prob-
able cause exists in a given situation. The Court then could act to correct 
only those egregious errors or conflicts occurring below. Unfortunately, 
many such errors and conflicts will arise, in part because of the nature of 
ad-hoc decisionmaking and in part for the same reasons that bright-line 
rules do not really clarify vehicle searches made incident to arrest. 205 
By severing search analysis from more familiar landmarks like prob-
able cause, the Court has forced lower courts and law enforcement agen-
cies to guess whether a particular search is reasonable.206 Just as police 
201. But see Katz, 389 U.S. at 347 (reasonable expectation of privacy misconstrued at ex-
pense of individual privacy); Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for 
Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REv. 583 (1989). 
202. Richard Posner observes, "The strongest argument for the pedigree approach and 
against a pragmatic or 'realistic' one may itself be pragmatic: judges just are not smart enough 
to make wise policy decisions, balancing a myriad of conflicting considerations that include the 
rule-of-law arguments against balancing." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURIS-
PRUDENCE 142-43 (1990). 
203. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 48. 
204. Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S. 1, 15 (1968). 
205. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text. 
206. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 48 (Retrospective balancing provides 
little prospective direction to police officers.); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the 
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 394 (1974) ("If there are no fairly clear rules 
telling the policeman what he may and may not do, courts are seldom going to say that what 
he did was unreasonable."); Ashdown, supra note 12, at 1310 (lack of clarity and predictability 
inherent in ordering privacy expectations leaves police and courts without standards to guide 
their conduct). 
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officers deprived of a purposive rule can act confidently and with gui-
dance only when the situation at hand closely parallels that which gave 
rise to the bright-line rule, so will courts be guided by Supreme Court 
pronouncements on reasonableness only when the case before them is 
virtually identical to established precedent. 
The second alternative, obviously, is for the Supreme Court to de-
cide cases in such a way that lower courts and actors within the criminal 
justice system will be able to fairly predict whether a search or arrest is 
reasonable. 207 One way to do this is for the Court to "show its hand" in 
its opinions, to make clear what motivated its decisions. Regrettably, 
this is largely ineffective in special needs and other reasonableness cases 
because the decisions necessarily tum on the subjective evaluations of 
specific features peculiar to the case in which they arise.2°8 Would school 
searches for criminal evidence be upheld if conducted for the sole pur-
pose of prosecuting the student? If government employees never locked 
their desks, but asked coworkers not to use their offices, are their expec-
tations of privacy reasonable? Can urine be "seized" from Customs of-
ficers who are neither armed nor exposed to sensitive information? The 
cases that would control the answers to such questions, and myriad 
others, provide virtually no guidance. 
The other way to assure predictability is to decide virtually all rea-
sonableness cases in favor of permitting or denying the search. The spe-
cial needs cases can be characterized as doing just that. The cases 
decided to date have been remarkably consistent in dispensing with the 
warrant requirement and reducing the required level of suspicion. 209 But 
this approach completely abdicates the judicial role in "deciding" cases. 
It strikes a balance once and for all against the enforcement of the 
Fourth Amendment's privacy guarantee.210 
Stated differently, the special needs cases decided recently have em-
braced a barely disguised formalism. They appear to abandon simplistic 
reliance on probable cause and warrants in favor of a more sophisticated 
and substantive analysis that will more often produce justice in the given 
207. Predictability is more than aesthetically pleasing. Holmes believed prophecies about 
the actions of courts to be no less than the law itself. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the 
Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 458 (1897). The accuracy oflegal prophecy, and the willingness 
and ability of members of society to resort to it, depends on fair predictability. 
208. See Aleinkoff, supra note 79, at 976 (Balancing opinions are radically underwritten; 
balancing takes place inside a "black box."). 
209. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
210. See Reamey, supra note 75, at 949 ("When measure after measure is removed from 
one side of the balance without tipping the scales, it can only be because gravity is stayed by an 
interested hand.") 
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case.211 
In reality, however, they substitute the incantation "special needs" 
for a more predictable probable cause and warrant analysis that was 
more clearly within the contemplation of the Framers and backed by 
decades of decisions. It may seem peculiar to argue that probable cause 
is more predictable than some other form of analysis. Coqsiderable pre-
cedent exists, however, construing what probable cause means in various 
contexts. Even more important are those numerous cases in which the 
Court has held that no probable cause existed. Because all of these cases 
have necessarily relied heavily on the facts the officers knew when they 
decided to arrest or search, a relatively complete "profile" of probable 
cause exists. The profile is not easily accessed, but is reasonably well 
understood by the actors in the criminal justice system. This wide-
spread understanding comes from decades of judicial decisionmaking. 
Perhaps after a similar number of decades of decisions, special needs will 
be as predictable as probable cause, but in the interim it will create con-
siderable confusion and a growing contempt for a system unable or un-
willing to make clear its constitutional limitations. Or, "special needs" 
may acquire no substantive content and be used by courts needing a con-
venient way to circumvent the Fourth Amendment. In either event, 
special needs will not just be a contemporary tool for flexible decision-
making as probable cause was before it. Probable cause decisions not 
only have a history; they also reflect a good-faith effort by the Supreme 
Court to define the contours of probable cause. Sometimes probable 
cause was found to exist, but often it was found lacking. To date, special 
needs have never been found lacking. 
Not only courts will suffer from the lack of consistency and predict-
ability of the new special needs and reasonableness analyses. Those 
charged with the enforcement of the law will be unable to discharge their 
duties.212 Citizens who are required to know the law or suffer its conse-
quences will be imperiled by unavoidable uncertainty. Only after the 
Court tells the next targeted subclass that its previously held expectation 
of privacy was unreasonable, will it be able to modify its behavior to 
accurately coincide with what the Supreme Court believes is reason-
able. 213 Until it is told, that next subclass can only wait and wonder how 
its privacy rights will weigh in the scales. If those rights are always 
211. This argument is made especially well in Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 
44-51. 
212. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 48. 
213. Such decisions are so fact-specific that they offer only marginal gains in predictability. 
School children, government workers, and vehicle salvage operators are now better informed 
than previously about their privacy rights, but the opinions directly involving them give lim-
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found to weigh lightly, there is a measure of predictability for the police 
and citizens, but it is bought at a high price. As one author warns: 
Before our courts decide to abandon the fourth amendment law 
that has protected the right of people to find private places and to 
be left alone, the need for these new law enforcement measures 
ought to be more clearly demonstrated. Otherwise, the most im-
portant victim of illegal drugs may be the liberty of a nation.214 
C. The Least Political Branch 
In addition to the inefficiency and inconsistency inherent in concen-
trating decisionmaking at the Supreme Court, another reason to rethink 
the trend exemplified by the special needs cases is that the Supreme 
Court is not politically suited to active participation in the war on crime. 
Professor Stephen Salzburg states this point succinctly: 
Judges' decisions might well make it easier for police and prosecu-
tors to investigate and convict those involved in drug trafficking. 
But this is not the task assigned to the judiciary by federal and 
state constitutions. The judicial task is quite the opposite; courts 
must ensure that they stand between forces seeking to investigate 
and convict and the individuals who are the targets of these forces, 
and judges must guard against overzealous law enforcement.215 
The judiciary is the least political of the three branches of govern-
ment. Members of the Court are nominated by one branch and con-
firmed by another. They have life tenure. The American constitutional 
scheme contemplates, and depends on, an independent, apolitical 
judiciary.216 
Few would argue, however, that judicial independence precludes the 
Court from adjudication of politically sensitive controversies, 217 or that 
the Members of the Court are immune from the pull of political currents. 
Those most opposed to an activist Court undoubtedly find at least some 
ited guidance as to future outcomes because the opinions reveal very little reason for the bal-
ance that was struck. 
214. Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 25. 
215. Id. at 3. 
216. See Address by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Northern Illinois University 
School of Law, de Kalb, illinois 2, 16 (Oct. 20, 1988) (copy available from the Public Informa-
tion Office of the Supreme Court of the United States) (independent judiciary enforcing written 
Constitution is a ''uniquely American contribution"); see also Vincent R. Johnson, The Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens of 1789, the Reign of Terror, and the Revolutionary 
Tribunal of Paris, 13 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 1, 15 (1990). 
At some point, separation of powers requires the Court to abstain from decisions appro-
priately made by one of the other branches of government. However, as Justice Brennan 
noted, "the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents 
a political question." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). 
217. See O'BRIEN, supra note 10. 
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politically motivated decisions to their liking.218 When the Court is char-
acterized as politically independent, the description is necessarily a quali-
fied one. More accurately, the Supreme Court is not a representative 
branch of government; the Court is not directly responsible to a constitu-
ency as are the other branches. 219 
This insulation from direct political influence provides the Court an 
opportunity, unique among the branches of government, to avoid re-
sponding to the exigencies of the time and resorting to shortsighted pol-
icy imperatives. In contrast, the pressure on elected officials to produce 
immediate results is enormous.220 Moreover, the Court's political insula-
tion imposes an affirmative duty to act in ways the other branches 
cannot. 
The Court has the duty of interpreting the Constitution in many of 
its most important aspects, and especially in those which concern 
the relations of the individual and the state. The political proposi-
tion underlying the survival of the power is that there are some 
phases of_ American life which should be beyond the reach of any 
218. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was one of the most political of all 
Supreme Court cases and has been widely accepted as reaching the right result. This is so 
despite the shaky legal foundations for the decision. But see Charles L. Black Jr., The Lawful-
ness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1959) (arguing that the decision in Brown 
was required by the Constitution); see also Julius G. Getman, Voices, TEx. L. REv. 577, 584-
85 (1988). 
219. Alexander Bickel has nicely summarized the point: 
Initially, great reliance for principled decision was placed in the Senators and the 
President, who have more extended terms of office and were meant to be elected only 
indirectly. Yet the Senate and the President were conceived of as less closely tied to, 
not as divorced from, electoral responsibility and the political marketplace. And so 
even then the need might have been felt for an institution which stands altogether 
aside from the current clash of interests, and which, insofar as is humanly possible, is 
concerned only with principle. We cannot know whether, as Thayer believed, our 
legislatures are what they are because we have judicial review, or whether we have 
judicial review and consider it necessary because legislatures are what they are. 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 25 (1962). 
220. Electronic dissemination of information has required politicians to answer quickly the 
demands of their constituency. Re-election demands that politicians at least appear to solve 
complex problems, and to aggressively address high profile issues, even when those problems 
and issues require protracted consideration, difficult choices, and long-term solutions. Alexan-
der Bickel observed this political reality nearly three deeades ago: 
I d. 
Men in all walks of public life are able occasionally to perceive this second aspect of 
public questions [the unintended or unappreciated bearing on values that have a 
more general and permanent interest]. Sometimes they are also able to base their 
decisions on it; that is one of the things we like to call acting on principle. Often they 
do not do so, however, particularly when they sit in legislative assemblies. There, 
when the pressure for immediate results is strong enough and emotions ride high 
enough, men will ordinarily prefer to act on expediency rather than take the long 
view. 
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majority, save by constitutional amendment.221 
Otherwise, a void would be left in the political dynamic, and the consti-
tutionally provided opportunity to do what courts do best would be 
wasted. 
The Supreme Court is largely ineffective when it abandons its role as 
preserver of core values to become a combatant against social ills. This 
ineffectiveness results in part from the way cases are brought to the 
Court.222 Unlike the legislature, the Court focuses its attention on rela-
tively narrow issues of law framed and brought to it by the litigants. 
These issues are narrowed by the existence of prior opinion by which the 
Court will feel bound and by the limited time and attention a supreme 
court can give competing cases on a crowded docket. Further narrowing 
results from the Court's self-imposed restraint and its unwillingness to 
usurp the prerogatives of other branches.223 The Court is also limited by 
rules of evidence, principles of code construction, standards of appellate 
review, and other procedural devices224 that do not exist in a legislative 
setting. Moreover, the Court is mindful that its credibility, and the re-
sponse of the other branches to its decisions, turns on its ability to appear 
to be acting like a court. 
The circumstances that determine the reasonableness of judicial 
decisions include statutory language, precedents, and all the other 
conventional materials of judicial decision making, including such 
prudential virtues familiar to lawyers as sensitivity to the limits of 
judicial knowledge and to the desirability of stability in law.225 
When the Supreme Court, or any court, deviates too radically from the 
accepted notions of judicial conduct, it risks being ignored, possibly the 
worst fate a court can suffer. 226 All of these factors influence the scope of 
221. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 
193, 196-97 (1952). 
222. See Wachtler, supra note 11, at 16-18 (outlines judicial process and concludes that 
judicial lawmaking complements, but differs from, legislative lawmaking). 
223. See id. Contrast this state of affairs with the relatively free-wheeling conduct of legis-
lative bodies. The range of issues they may address is much larger; legislators are supported by 
staff members and governmental agencies capable of providing or gathering independent data 
bearing on the issues; and the legislature, unlike a court, decides for itself the direction of its 
inquiry, how issues will be framed, and the means used to advance the inquiry. Perhaps most 
importantly, a legislature has access through lobbyists, constituents, experts, and special inter-
est groups to raw and refined data on how the public feels about the matter. No one suggests 
that legislatures are not appropriately concerned about public response, or that they should 
not respond to it. That suggestion is, however, often made about courts. 
224. Rostow, supra note 221, at 198. 
225. See POSNER, supra note 202, at 131. These conventional resources and constraints of 
judicial decision-making are foreign to both the legislator and the arbitrator. 
226. It is more important for a court to be respected than for it to be popular. The 
Supreme Court should lead by moral example precisely because it is a highly visible legal 
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the Court's lawmaking. 227 
The composition of the Court also calls into serious question its abil-
ity to accurately gauge the "community's moral intuitions"228 in decid-
ing whether a search or seizure is reasonable. Precisely because the 
Court is not selected by and answerable to a constituency, it may be con-
siderably out of touch with society's norms. That only nine Justices sit 
and that only one woman and two Mrican-Americans have ever served 
on the Court, strongly suggest that many views go unrepresented by 
members of the Court, a fact that argues against the Court acting in 
overtly political ways. 229 
Courts, on the other hand, are well suited to preserving enduring 
constitutional and social values. Alexander Bickel stated this well: 
[C]ourts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of princi-
ple that legislatures and executives do not possess. Judges have, or 
should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow 
the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This 
is crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a society, and it is 
not something that institutions can do well occasionally, while op-
erating for the most part with a different set of gears. It calls for a 
habit of mind, and for undeviating institutional customs. Another 
advantage that courts have is that questions of principle never 
carry the same aspect for them as they did for the legislature or the 
institution. Involvement in a street fight over controversies of the day undermines the respect 
for, and in turn the effectiveness of, the decisions of the Court. As Professor John Burkoff 
observed: 
[T]he diminution of liberties begins with the increasing disrespect for-or disregard 
of-our own legal rules and institutions. If the courts-especially the Supreme 
Court-fail to follow the law, or if they are widely believed to be manipulating it to 
reach predetermined ends, how can the citizenry be expected to respect- or even to 
follow-the law themselves? 
Burkoff, supra note 4, at 556; see Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 3-4 ("cheating" by courts dimin-
ishes capacity to legitimate governmental decisions). 
227. The pejorative "activist" label sums up much of the criticism leveled at the Court by 
opponents of its decisions. Despite the efforts of the Court to disguise "lawmaking" decisions 
to give them legitimacy and greater acceptance, some fictions are too transparent. Parties 
benefitted by the decisions are understandably disinclined to describe the Court in which they 
won as "activist," but the losers do not hesitate to do so in an apparent attempt to undermine 
the decision's persuasive force. See POSNER, supra note 202, at 132 (judicial self-restraint is a · 
political theory rather than the outcome of legal reasoning). 
228. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 89. 
229. Justices of the Supreme Court have never been accused of being representative of 
American society at large. With almost no exceptions, the members have been white, well-
educated men from the mainstream of the legal profession. See O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at Ch. 
2. It is hardly remarkable that they may not be directly in touch with the contemporary views 
of all segments of society; it is far more remarkable that the Court has demonstrated as much 
diversity of thought as it has. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 100. Because the 
Supreme Court was never designed to be answerable to a constituency, the composition of the 
Court is much less troubling than it would be otherwise. 
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executive. Statutes, after all, deal typically with abstract or dimly 
foreseen problems. The courts are concerned with the flesh and 
blood of an actual case. This tends to modify, perhaps to lengthen, 
everyone's view. It also provides an extremely salutary proving 
ground for all abstractions; it is conducive, in a phrase of Holmes, 
to thinking things, not words, and thus to the evolution of princi-
ple by a process that tests as it creates.230 
Political isolation does not impede the Court in this role;231 rather, it 
facilitates the Court's work by shielding it from the distractions of a con-
stituency. Specifically, political isolation permits the Supreme Court to 
act in the best interests of the whole, sometimes by ignoring the wishes of 
the majority. Justice Brennan observed: 
There is a sense in which judicial review is decidedly counter-
majoritarian. The judiciary does not sit to count votes. It rests on 
the principle, expressed in the Constitution, that there are circum-
stances in which the majority must yield to the greater national 
interest in the protection of rights. 232 
Opinions serve as. effective vehicles for analyzing and explaining the 
policy considerations that ultimately determine the decision's persuasive-
ness and its impact on the other branches and the public. The legislature 
has no close analogue. 233 The push and pull of politics effectively forces 
legislators to abandon any inclinations to uphold unpopular causes on 
the basis of principle. Only the occasional "lame-duck" officeholder, 
freed from concern about reelection, will commit political suicide in de-
fense of some noble principle. 234 
Many of the same factors that limit or facilitate legislation also dis-
tinguish the executive branch from the judicial. The Executive is also 
directly accountable to a constituency, has many independent sources of 
information, and appropriately responds to public sentiment. Like legis-
latures, and unlike courts, the Executive lacks "the leisure, the training, 
and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends 
of govemment."235 
230. BICKEL, supra note 219, at 25-26; see Edward H. Levi, The Nature of Judicial Reason-
ing, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 395 (1965); Wachtler, supra note 11, at 16-18. 
231. Political independence and judicial decisionmaking processes are especially well suited 
to the definition and development of individual liberty rights. See Wachtler, supra note 11, at 
19. 
232. Brennan Jr., supra note 8, at 6. 
233. See PosNER, supra note 202, at 131 (conventional resources and constraints of judicial 
decisionmaking are foreign to both the legislator and the arbitrator). 
234. The political rhetoric of principle should not be confused with the real thing. For 
example, it may be politically expedient to publicly support the freedom of speech involved in 
a farmers' demonstration against unpopular agricultural policy, but denounce flag burning by 
a political protester as un-American. 
235. BICKEL, supra note 219, at 25-26. 
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D. The Supreme Court's Duty to Decide Aspirationally 
The judiciary is the only branch capable of consistently aspirational 
decisionmaking. 236 The constitutional scheme of government intended 
that the judiciary act as the keel of the ship of state, and not the rud-
der.237 This role lacks the glamour and excitement of day-to-day 
micromanagement, but it is indispensable. More accurately, this role is 
as indispensable as the "core" values or principles it protects.238 
When the Supreme Court decides that separate is not equal or that a 
right to privacy exists, it does so by reaching deep within the traditional 
values represented by the Constitution, searching the collective latent 
meaning of the words rather than demanding an expressed prescrip-
tion.239 When the Supreme Court·requires probable cause or a warrant, 
its tas~ is simplified by the express command of the Constitution. Devi-
ating from that command is a serious step, but not in itself inconsistent 
with the Court's proper role. The Court goes too far only when it loses 
touch with the principles of the Fourth Amendment, when it fails in its 
duty to remind us of the sometimes unpopular principles it is sworn to 
defend.240 
236. Edward Levi alluded to this function of the Court: 
Finally, without regard for the technical propriety of what the Court does, there is no 
doubt that the Court's influence as an acceptable objective force is diminished the 
greater the controversy. This easy and customary point, however, must be corrected 
by an awareness that it is the Court's appeal to our better selves, connoting some 
controversy, which is the source of its moral power and persuasion. 
Levi, supra note 230, at 409. 
237. See id. 
238. Some say the American public would not support the Bill of Rights if it were put to a 
vote today. Regardless of whether this is true, the Bill of Rights is not up for a vote today, or 
any other day, unless a supermajority agrees that it should be dismantled or modified. See 
BICKEL, supra note 219, at 27 ("Matters of expediency are not generally submitted to direct 
referendum. Nor should matters of principle, which require even more intensive deliberation, 
be so submitted."); Brennan Jr., supra note 8, at 4 ("Wary of the fragility of constitutional 
guarantees, the Framers of our Constitution devised an amendment process that all but pre-
cludes the diminution of the textual rights."). If constitutional guarantees were easily repealed 
or modified, governmental excesses might be subsequently curbed by reinstatement or further 
modification of these rights, but the country's principles would be no more permanent than the 
latest television sitcom riding a wave of popularity. 
239. See PosNER, supra note 202, at 141 (''The framers gave us a compass, not a 
blueprint."); see also James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Ex-
panded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HAsTINGS L.J. 645, 670 (1985) 
(privacy interest protected by Fourth Amendment is broader than narrow reading of the words 
suggests). 
240. If the principles of the Constitution are truly enduring, perhaps the Court does not 
need to remind us of them, and we would not suffer their legislative dilution. See Wasserstrom 
& Seidman, supra note 11, at 76. This argument, however, ignores human frailty. In recent 
memory, popular opinion strongly favored prosecution of flag burners despite the obvious free 
speech implications. Why would American society have more sympathy for the privacy rights 
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Courts, executives, and legislatures may all choose to act aspiration-
ally, but constitutional courts have the duty to do so. A lawful and or-
derly society is itself an aspiration, but for the Supreme Court one that 
must be sought by faithful adherence to the announced principles of the 
society. Chief Justice Rehnquist has described a judge's role: "to admin-
ister a system of justice whose twin purposes are the conviction of the 
guilty and the vindication of the innocent."241 Professor John Burkoff 
has observed that even these goals do not outweigh "constitutional re-
straints on excessive police conduct."242 Decisions like those in the spe-
cial needs cases substitute the short-term gain for the long-term stability, 
the thrill of waging war on crime243 for the predictable protection of 
privacy.244 
Justice Stevens dissented in California v. Hodari D. to the Court's 
narrowing of the definition of "seizure" to uphold the admission into 
evidence of contraband abandoned by a suspect fleeing police: 
Some sacrifice of freedom always accompanies an expansion in the 
executive's unreviewable law enforcement powers. A court more 
sensitive to the purposes of the Fourth Amendment would insist on 
greater rewards to society before decreeing the sacrifice it makes 
today .... The Court's immediate concern with containing crimi-
nal activity poses a substantial, though unintended, threat to values 
that are fundamental and enduring. 245 
of those accused of street crime than it has for the speech rights of those violating a flag 
desecration statute? Nor does American society as a whole correlate privacy rights of 
"criminals" with privacy rights of law-abiding citizens. 
241. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 520 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
242. Burkoff, supra note 4, at 557. The aspirations captured in the Constitution's articu-
lated and implied principles largely focus on individual rights rather than the narrow desires of 
government. The scope of these aspirations is reflected in a speech by Justice William Brennan 
who said: "The Constitution with its Bill of Rights thus has a bright future, as well as a 
glorious past, for its spirit inheres in the aspirations not only of all Americans, but of all the 
people throughout the world who yearn for dignity and freedom." Brennan Jr., supra note 8, 
at 9; see California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1562 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Court 
must protect "values that are fundamental and enduring"). 
243. In a criticism also apropos of the Rehnquist Court, Professor Burkoff noted: "The 
Burger Court often acts, in its resolution of Fourth Amendment issues, however, as much like 
an overzealous police department, as it does like a court. It quite clearly sees its preeminent 
role in criminal cases as that of insuring that criminals go to jaiL" Burkoff, supra note 4, at 
551. This criticism was echoed recently by Justice Stevens, citing Alexander Bickel and dis-
senting from the Court's narrowing of the definition of "seizure": "The Court's immediate 
concern with containing criminal activity poses a substantial, though unintended, threat to 
values that are fundamental and enduring." Hodari, 111 S. Ct. at 1562 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
244. Fourth Amendment guarantees extend beyond the sanctity of personal effects or the 
home. Privacy is an indispensable predicate for the enjoyment of other liberties. Tomkovicz, 
supra note 239, at 667. 
245. Hodari, 111 S. Ct. at 1562 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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E. Which Aspirations Are the Rights Ones? 
At the end of the debate, the Court must fllally decide what the 
enduring principles of the Constitution are. 246 Guidance in making this 
foundational decision comes from several sources, including the clear 
declarations of the Framers, the history of the document, and, to some 
extent, conventional morality.247 The purpose of the Constitution, and 
especially the Bill of Rights, is also of great significance. The language of 
the Fourth Amendment is clearly designed to protect privacy and to es-
tablish safeguards against governmental intrusion. 248 Given this design, 
in cases where a court is hardpressed to decide among competing princi-
ples because no clear prescription exists, the court should prefer the prin-
ciple that advances the individual's privacy rights, the prescription that is 
clear.249 Professor Arnold Loewy reminds us that "so long as fourth 
amendment standards are forged in cases involving not very nice people, 
the Court must be concerned about the negative impact its decisions have 
on those of us who are nice."250 A weighty presumption in favor of the 
individual and against governmental intrusion is most consistent with the 
246. The late Judge J. Braxton Craven suggested that these decisions are "exercises in 
pragmatics often clothed in legalistic syllogisms and that the controlling principle, seldom 
expressed, is expediency: What is best for the nation?" J. Braxton Craven Jr., Paean to" Prag-
matism, 50 N.C. L. REv. 977, 981 (1972). "What is best for the nation," however, must be 
taken in the broad sense. It may seem to a court best for the nation to have yet another tool 
with which to fight crime, but the higher and more important need of the nation in the long 
run is for individual privacy. See Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 3 ("Courts that tum their backs 
on constitutional principles do no service to the nation in the long run, notwithstanding any 
perceived short-run gains resulting from their toleration of practices that ought to be 
condemned."). 
247. For a thorough description of the various approaches to constitutional interpretation, 
see Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11. 
248. See Burkoff, supra note 4, at 522 ("The aim of the draftsmen of the Fourth Amend-
ment to prevent oppressive breaches of personal privacy by agents of the State cannot be gain-
said."); Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 3 (courts must stand between forces of investigation and 
prosecution and those who are targets of law enforcement). However, Baker has also sug-
gested that the Fourth Amendment coincidentaily "recognizes a practical governmental au-
thority to seek out and punish law violators." Baker, supra note 27. 
249. Ronald Dworkin poses the interesting question of whether even an express constitu-
tional command is a "rule" instead of a "principle" that should be given deference unless it is 
clearly outweighed by another policy or principle. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 
35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 28-29 (1967-68). Even if the individual's right to privacy is a "princi-
ple" in this sense, it is entitled to great deference. Dworkin suggests that words like "reason-
able" that modify a rule make it "depend to some extent upon principles or policies lying 
beyond the rule." Id. at 29. The reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment was 
meant only to call into play principles lying beyond the usual rule - presumably the principle 
of individual privacy against which the rule should be read. 
250. Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 
MICH. L. REv. 1229, 1256 (1983); cf. Wisotsky, supra note 2, at 913 (drug enforcement has 
reached into the lives of ordinary people, not just drug dealers). 
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principle suggested by the amendment's language.251 Such a presump-
tion is also most consistent with the history of the amendment.252 At the 
time the Bill of Rights was adopted, police presence was virtually nonex-
istent.253 Had the Framers been able to foresee the invasion of govern-
ment into the daily lives of citizens, would the privacy protections of the 
Fourth Amendment have been less than they ·are, or more?254 Would 
reasonableness have been used to soften the hard rule of probable cause 
and warrant? 
Aspirational decisionmaking does not preclude the use of reasona-
bleness as a way to judge the constitutionality of a search or seizure. 
This method should, however, be employed only in those cases in which 
the balance tips so obviously in favor of the government and against the 
individual that reasonable minds could not differ. The Supreme Court 
could, despite the associated problems, continue to judge searches and 
seizures against a standard of reasonableness, but with a consistent pre-
disposition in favor of individual privacy and against governmental intru-
sion. 255 This approach would preserve the core principle of the 
amendment; it would be "aspirational," and it would increase the pre-
dictability of decisions by clarifying the purpose of the decisionmaking 
process. Those who favor a more flexible version of the Fourth Amend-
ment might find this approach acceptable. The Court could then engage 
in more sophisticated and context-based decisionmaking without aban-
doning altogether the traditional mode of analysis. This method seeks to 
251. See Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 3 (judicial task is to guard against overzealous law 
enforcement). 
252. See Grayson, supra note 15; see also Tomkovicz, supra note 27, at 670-73 (privacy 
rights extend beyond secrecy to encompass fundamental liberties from government intrusion). 
253. Police forces did not appear in America until more than fifty years after the Bill of 
Rights was adopted. Grayson, supra note 15, at 113. 
254. See /d. at 113. These queries are not intended to suggest that the Supreme Court 
should be governed by what it perceives the Framers would have wanted had they been able to 
anticipate the development of society. The great strength of the Constitution, and a credit to 
the Framers, is that the commands were cast broadly to accommodate changing needs. It is 
useful, however, in searching for a purpose in the words of the Constitution, to remember the 
context in which they originated. If the Framers felt, at a time when government was not 
nearly so invasive or pervasive, that citizens needed protection from searches and seizures, 
then they were either extraordinarily gifted with foresight, or they felt strongly about the value 
of privacy. Assuming the latter because the former seems much less likely, an "aspirational" 
Court seeking to remind us through its decisions of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
should decide in ways that most protect the individual from government. 
255. See Sundby, supra note 28, at 383-84 (many of Fourth Amendment's "present ills" are 
symptoms of Court's failure to define reasonableness to reflect amendment's underlying values 
and purposes). 
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integrate the aspirational into the pragmatic. 256 
Applying this method of analysis to the special needs cases may not 
always invalidate the search, but it would always remind the other 
branches of government, and the people, that privacy is a principle worth 
its price: 257 The Court should explain why school discipline is more im-
portant than privacy. It should divulge why it believes school adminis-
trators, government supervisors, and probation officers, but not police 
officers, are incapable of determining probable cause. The Justices 
should demand from the government truly compelling reasons for dis-
pensing with the traditional Fourth Amendment privacy safeguards. 258 
Those reasons do not include inconvenience or frustration, for the pur-
pose of the amendment is to frustrate and hinder government searches. 259 
And the proper role of the Supreme Court is not to facilitate searches. 260 
If special needs count at all in the constitutional balance, they must 
be needs other than the needs of law enforcement; the balance for those 
has already been struck. For a special need to justify anything less than 
probable cause, individualized suspicion, and a warrant, it must be a 
need even more compelling than law enforcement needs. Otherwise, the 
Court is substantially increasing the risk of governmental mistake and 
harm to the citizen for a reason less worthwhile than law enforcement, 
which demands more stringent safeguards. The urinalysis cases illustrate 
this point. The special needs used to justify the intrusions were deter-
rence of drug use among Customs officers261 and prevention of railroad 
accidents, 262 both concededly important goals. But are they more impor-
tant than the detection and prevention of crime?263 If not, why does the 
Constitution permit searches in the urinalysis cases without any suspi-
cion at all and without a warrant, whereas a search for evidence of crime 
256. See Baker, supra note 27, at 887 ("our constitutional dualism ... creates a tension in 
methodology between flexibility and fixity"). 
257. Cf. Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 29 (Fourth Amendment does not prevent dealing 
with drug and AIDS problems, but requires that "courts resist hasty overreactions and take a 
hard look at the need for intrusion and the means employed"). 
258. See Sundby, supra note 28, at 442 (compelling-government-interest/least-intrusive-
means test establishes a high standard for all intrusions and recognizes that all intrusions im-
plicate privacy). 
259. See Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 3 (Constitution assigns judiciary task of guarding 
against overzealous law enforcement). 
260. See id. 
261. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989). 
262. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 606, 620 (1989). 
263. Commentators have noted that governmental interests, because they are tangible and 
visible, always will be weighed more heavily than less tangible privacy rights. See Sundby, 
supra note 28, at 439; see also DiPippa, supra note 190, at 497 ("[P]rivacy inevitably loses 
when balanced against law enforcement"). 
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requires both?264 The answer should not be because the Supreme Court 
wants to covertly restructure the Constitution's balance. 265 
And the answer cannot be that the special needs cumulate with law 
enforcement needs because that analysis would too greatly denigrate the 
constitutional safeguards associated with law enforcement needs merely 
because of the presence of special needs. If law enforcement needs are 
any part of the rationale for conducting a search, the traditional protec-
tions associated with searches for criminal evidence should be present.266 
Law enforcement is itself a very important and weighty government in-
terest. If the constitutional scheme requires probable cause and a war-
rant for searches designed to produce criminal evidence, it is hard to 
imagine what further societal need would be so significant that its pres-
ence should reduce the standard of suspicion and judicial review. The 
Supreme Court has, of course, identified many such needs, but the con-
ceptual integrity of the practice is certainly questionable. 
On a more elementary level, if these special needs or ones analogous 
to them are so important, arguably they would be specifically referenced 
by the Constitution. However, the document does not except Fourth 
Amendment prohibitions from application in cases of important govern-
mental need, like law enforcement. It speaks directly only to protection 
of "the right of the people to be secure."267 The goal of law enforcement 
may be implicitly recognized by limiting but not altogether prohibiting 
searches and seizures. And other equally important goals may deserve 
similar recognition. But the Supreme Court should be very careful about 
reading goals into, and protections out of, the Constitution. 268 
264. In fact, bodily intrusions for criminal evidence are not always permitted even when 
probable cause exists and the probative value of the evidence is great. See Winston v. Lee, 470 
U.S. 753 (1985) (court properly denied authorization for surgery to remove bullet from 
defendant). 
265. Speaking of the decision in Von Raab, one commentator noted: 
The court did not present an effective argument concerning the tangible risks to 
which society is exposed in the absence of drug testing in the Customs Service. How-
ever, by applying the balancing test and by trumpeting the compelling governmental 
interest rationale, the Court furtively circumvented the requirement of reasonable 
suspicion. 
Westover, supra note 144, at 820 (citation omitted). 
266. See Sundby, supra note 28, at 433 (Warrant Clause's standards for criminal investiga-
tion provide appropriate guide for interpreting reasonableness). 
267. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. 
268. See Sundby, supra note 28, at 400 ("Redefining probable cause to include government 
justifications independent of suspicious activity not only conceptually diminished the role of 
traditional probable cause in fourth amendment analysis but also diluted its meaning in a way 
that created a new receptiveness to government intrusions."). Finally, if government needs are 
employed in an effort to determine reasonableness, those needs should be used only to decide 
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III. Conclusion 
It is unlikely that the Framers, having crafted so carefully the 
branches of government, each with a unique function, meant for the 
Supreme Court to micromanage the Fourth Amendment. Surely they 
did not intend that the nation's highest court engage in the kind of ad-
hoc balancing that the search for reasonableness requires. 269 Had this 
been their intention, they would have designed the Court as an institu-
tion and as a process to be better suited to the task. 
Even if the Supreme Court wished to facilitate the detection and 
prosecution of crime, it has a higher purpose. It must safeguard the con-
stitutional protections of those not within the criminal justice system, 
those not before the trial court accused of crime. Only the judicial 
branch has both the power and the freedom to insure that the Fourth 
Amendment is not just a faded scrap of paper housed in the National 
Archives. 
"Special needs" and other attempts to diminish the role of the 
Fourth Amendment as a hindrance to law enforcement, reflect Roper's 
misunderstanding of the function of law and are unworthy of the Na-
tion's highest court. The law, and especially the law of a constitution, 
exists to protect all of the members of society, not just the good ones. 
Removing laws to get after the Devil may be well intentioned, but the 
result is that all of society is laid open to the evils those laws protected 
against. As More says, "Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my 
own safety's sake."270 If we use special needs as an axe to cut down the 
laws in pursuit of the Devil, we must imagine not only what the world 
will be like without the Devil, ,but what it will be like without the laws. 
that issue, and not to answer whether a privacy right exists in the first place. Tomkovicz, 
supra note 239, at 695-96. 
269. Professor Schulhofer explained the Court's transformation by noting that: 
In our constitutional mythology, the job of the courts, after all, is to find law, to 
ascertain the rights of the individual, not to balance costs and benefits like a legisla-
ture or even a construction engineer. In this sense, the Burger Court again seemed 
even less respectful of the judicial role than the Warren Court was, even less re-
strained in treading on the policy-making functions of the other branches of govern-
ment. Yet the Burger Court never got a bad name for this in its criminal cases, 
probably because it tied its activist methods to conservative results. It used cost-
benefit analysis like a legislature, but the government won. 
Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 19. 
270. BOLT, supra note 1, at 38. 

